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I. INTRODUCTION
The burgeoning caseload of the U.S. courts of appeals, which has
risen more rapidly than has the number of appellate judges, has caused a
problem for these mandatory jurisdiction courts. As they must rule on all
appeals brought to them, even if the issues are elementary and the
answers obvious, what should they do? To aid in coping with their
caseload, for close to thirty years they have issued memorandum
dispositions and orders which are not to be cited as precedent, although
they could be cited for purposes related to “law of the case.” There is
now a movement to allow their citation not as precedent but in efforts to
persuade the court.3 Because initially they were not published in the
reporters, they came to be called “unpublished” dispositions; however,
for some time, they have been available on Westlaw and on court

3
Proposed Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure would remove
any prohibition or restriction on the citation of unpublished opinions. In August 2003, the
Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules had published the rule for comment, and had
recommended approval and transmission of the proposal to the Judicial Conference. In
June 2004, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure postponed action on the
new rule so that the Federal Judicial Center could complete research on some matters
raised by the proposed Rule’s opponents, who were concentrated in the Ninth Circuit.
For an account, see How Appealing, http://www.legalaffairs.org/howappealing/2004_
06_01_appellateblog_archive.html#108793216008620 (June 22, 2004, 15:22 EST)
(Howard Bashman). That study, Tim Reagan et al., Citations to Unpublished Opinions in
the Federal Courts of Appeals (June 1, 2005), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/Citatio2.pdf/$File/Citatio2.pdf, was completed in June 2005, and, after the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure approved the new Rule, in September
2005 the Judicial Conference endorsed the rule change and forwarded the new rule to
Congress. See Tony Mauro, Judicial Conference Supports Citing Unpublished Opinions,
LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 21, 2005, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=
1127207112718.
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websites and, more recently, have been published in West’s Federal
Appendix.4
The frequent use of such dispositions, which now constitute more
than three-fourths of all courts of appeals rulings,5 has led to
considerable rhetoric about whether or not they should be used; indeed,
the level of controversy may be said to exceed the amount of knowledge
held even by many of those who use the federal appellate courts. It is
now long past time for systematic attention to the actuality of practices in
the circuits leading to unpublished dispositions. Whether dispositions
become published opinions or unpublished memorandums is a result of
actions by the judges, clerks, and parties who prepare them and the
process through which they move, including discussion among the
judges on a panel as to the type of disposition that should result; attention
has been given to that process elsewhere.6 To assist greater
understanding of “unpublished” dispositions, this article offers some
empirical groundwork about the guidelines that have been created to
determine whether judges should produce either a published opinion or
an unpublished disposition; that groundwork is necessary if people are to
evaluate proposals for changing the rules concerning their use. Included
are the circumstances in which unpublished dispositions are used, the
guidelines for publication, their enforcement, compliance with those
guidelines, and other norms concerning non-publication.
This article provides information about judges’ views on an
important aspect of the process by which they make decisions, as well as
a partial view of interaction among judges as they reach a final product.
Receiving principal attention is the process in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, although some examples are drawn from other
circuits. What takes place in the Ninth Circuit can be taken as indicative
of what happens elsewhere because, despite minor procedural variations
from one circuit to the next, basic elements of the process are similar
across circuits, as are the formal criteria for publication. One important
4
The term “unpublished” dispositions, although now a misnomer, is used here
because it has long been standard terminology, although it is now “no more than a
shorthand for opinions that are designated by the court as ‘not for publication,’”
Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 3
(2002) (Statement of Arthur Hellman, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School
of Law) [hereinafter Hellman statements].
5
See Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States
Courts of Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRACT. & PROCESS 199, 201 (2001).
6
See Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals:
Making the Decision to Publish, 3 J. APP. PRACT. & PROCESS 325 (2001); Stephen L.
Wasby, Unpublished Court of Appeals Decisions: A Hard Look at the Process, 14 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67 (2004).
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difference, however, is that Ninth Circuit memorandum dispositions are
written text — not the one-line “Affirmed - see Rule 36-1” dispositions
common in, for example, the Third and Eleventh Circuits — and the
object of considerable criticism.
The picture presented here is drawn from not-for-publication
dispositions from the late 1970s to the present time;7 discussions with
some judges; files in closed cases; and the author’s extended observation
of the functioning of the Ninth Circuit. Material from the files is used to
provide examples for each of the elements examined. Because those files
contain clerks’ work and judges’ communications with each other during
consideration of a case, they provide a more complete understanding of
why cases are published or not published.8
The article begins with discussion of the guidelines themselves and
related norms concerning non-publication; approaches to evaluating
compliance with the guidelines and norms; and how the guidelines might
be enforced. Each of the Ninth Circuit’s guidelines are discussed in turn,
followed by treatment of other norms and considerations affecting
publication that have been identified. Receiving particular attention are
dispositions containing issues of first impression, those with separate
opinions, and those reversing the lower court or agency.
A. Guidelines
Judges’ decisions whether to publish are largely, but not
completely, discretionary. The criteria or guidelines in each court of
appeals’ Local Rules, which once spoke of when a decision must be
published but now speak of when they may be published, are permissive
rather than mandatory although they remain formal. They are also
relatively consistent across circuits in their wording although they “differ
somewhat in their application.”9

7

Unpublished dispositions for 1972 through 1977 were examined in the San
Francisco library of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; these dispositions
predated even the inclusion of Federal Reporter lists of such cases, and thus do not bear
“F.2d” citations.
8
Reliance on the papers of a single judge poses the risk of lack of
representativeness, and, through quotation, certainly leads to greater prominence to that
judge’s views. However, as any one judge sits with many other combinations of judges
over time, these multiple interactions should serve to provide a breadth of views and
reveal recurring patterns.
9
JUDITH A. MCKENNA, LAURAL L. HOOPER & MARY CLARK, CASE MANAGEMENT
PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 18 (Federal Judicial Center, 2000).
State courts have also enunciated criteria for publication or non-publication of
dispositions. See Arthur G. Scotland, The Filing and Publication of Appellate Opinions:
A Survey of the Council of Chief Judges of Courts of Appeal, JUDGES’ J. 31 (Winter
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The criteria state when cases should be published, not when they
should not be published. The Ninth Circuit’s General Orders (G.O. 4.3)10
say an opinion should be written only if the panel determines that a
published opinion is necessary, and according to Ninth Circuit Rule 36-2,
a disposition should be published only if it:
(a) Establishes, alters, modifies or clarifies a rule of law, or
(b) Calls attention to a rule of law which appears to have been
generally overlooked, or
(c) Criticizes existing law, or
(d) Involves a legal or factual issue of unique interest or
substantial public importance, or
(e) Is a disposition of a case in which there is a published opinion
by a lower court or administrative agency, unless the panel
determines that publication is unnecessary for clarifying the
panel’s disposition of the case, or
(f) Is a disposition of a case following a reversal or remand by
the United States Supreme Court, or
(g) Is accompanied by a separate concurring or dissenting
expression, and the author of such separate expression requests
publication of the disposition of the Court and the separate
expression.11

The elements of this Rule have remained quite stable over time;
exceptions are the additions of (c) and (f) to what was the Ninth Circuit’s
Rule 21(b) of twenty years ago.
These guidelines, while providing the context within which judges
make decisions whether or not to publish, are not “the whole story.” For
one thing, “[f]or many courts the written rules do not reflect the actual
standards used by the court.”12 Other, unstated norms or desiderata also

2004), which distinguishes between criteria to publish, id. at 31, or to use memorandum
dispositions, id. at 33.
10
U.S. CT. OF APP. 9TH CIR. GEN. ORDER 4.3 (2005), available at http://www.ca9.us
courts.gov/ca9/Documents.nsf/54dbe3fb372dcb6c8825ce50065fcb8/f769f3ad364d1b6d8
8256864007a1479?OpenDocument.
11
9TH CIR. R. 36-2.
12
DONNA STIENSTRA, UNPUBLISHED DISPOSITIONS: PROBLEMS OF ACCESS AND USE IN
THE COURTS OF APPEALS 37 (Federal Judicial Center, 1985).
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come into play, and there are factors shown to be related to choice of an
unpublished disposition.
Among the norms are that rulings on non-final/non-dispositive
matters, those based on sufficiency of the evidence, and those based on
state law such as cases coming to the federal courts under its diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction need not be published. In such situations, one can
talk of courts that are “reported to have adopted such a policy in
practice,” as was the case with the Ninth Circuit and intercircuit conflict
cases.13 Norms are, however, not as closely followed as rules, and the
pattern of compliance is even less clear for “constructed” criteria. Some
of these norms and factors are easily identifiable, perhaps because, like
publication of reversals, they are part of other circuits’ formal rules,
while others are categories an observer can construct where use of
unpublished dispositions is sufficiently regular to allow an inference of
the presence of an implicit norm.
B. Evaluating Use
That the guidelines are not self-executing and that compliance with
them is less than complete is evident in claims that there is inconsistency
among unpublished dispositions and in research findings that there is
considerable slippage in the application of criteria.14 However, we must
go beyond such general statements to a closer examination of
unpublished dispositions, in which our concern is with those cases
resolved by unpublished memorandum when publication might seem
appropriate. We adopt this focus on unpublished dispositions rather than
published ones because one does not read criticism of over-publication;
instead there is criticism of overuse of unpublished dispositions.15 This
makes a “violation” in the direction of not publishing perhaps more
serious than publication when the criteria for publication are not met. It
may be easier to question the wisdom of the decision to publish than to
determine that an unpublished disposition should have been published; a
brief memorandum disposition may mask information that would lead to
the conclusion that publication was in order. There is little dispute that
many individual cases are extremely clear-cut candidates for unpublished

13

Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
See Donald R. Songer, Danna Smith & Reginald S. Sheehan, Nonpublication in
the Eleventh Circuit: An Empirical Analysis, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 963 (1989); Donald
R. Songer, Criteria for Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Formal
Rules Versus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307 (1990).
15
See, e.g., William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and
the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273,
281-86 (1996).
14
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disposition. Beyond them, however, evaluating unpublished rulings is
harder, and when judges say virtually nothing, determining whether nonpublication is proper is very difficult.
Some people appear to approach evaluation of unpublished
dispositions with an apparent presumption that all dispositions should be
published and a stance that every decision not to publish is
questionable.16 Some also seem to hold the further belief that judges,
acting in malign fashion, use memorandum dispositions to hide
intracircuit inconsistency and perhaps as well to avoid hard choices.17
Those claims of impropriety are usually based on individual instances
without an indication of how frequently that type of problem occurs, and
claims that dispositions in unpublished rulings are not really reasoned
dispositions18 seem designed to put in question the whole enterprise of
using unpublished dispositions. An alternative approach, used in this
article, treats judges’ decisions to issue not-for-publication dispositions
as having been undertaken in good faith, with the judges having made
some effort to provide reasons, if not full-blown disquisitions, to
litigants. Instead, decisions to publish or not are evaluated in terms of the
guidelines the courts themselves create and the norms they have
developed, as it is legitimate to ask how those criteria appear to be
applied.
C. Enforcement
Before turning to look at particular criteria, we ask how the criteria
might be enforced. The court’s staff attorneys could play a role in
uncovering intracircuit conflicts that exist in unpublished dispositions
and could prompt the judges to resolve the conflict. On case inventory
sheets, the staff attorneys note prior memorandum dispositions on the
question in the present case, and they may further recommend that the
panel publish the present case. From time to time, courts have charged
staff attorneys with examining not-for-publication dispositions before
they are filed to see if they fit the criteria and to recommend the
publication of dispositions they feel are erroneously designated “not for
publication.”
However, not only do staff attorneys’ workloads give them little
time for this oversight function, but it is also possible that they are
hesitant to call possible errors to the judges’ attention or that judges
16
See id.; see also William M. Richman, An Argument on the Record for More
Federal Judgeships, 1 J. APP. PRACT. & PROCESS 37 (1999).
17
See Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 157 (1998).
18
See id. at 163 n.24.

48

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 2:041

ignore their suggestions, reinforcing such hesitancy. Indeed, some judges
have suggested that colleagues are unlikely to respond favorably to
publication suggestions from (mere) staff attorneys. This view is evident
in a memorandum from a judge to colleagues reporting that a disposition
had not been filed “because the staff decided that under our rules an
opinion is required” and noting that the staff “seem to have overruled the
panel majority.”19 Although this judge had earlier argued unsuccessfully
within the panel for publication, he said, “I hope the staff loses . . .
because I think that judges’ views should prevail”; he later reported that
“the clerk lost in the fight” on that case.20
Perhaps the most important way to enforce the criteria in a multimember court, short of appointing a “Publication Rules Czar,” is for
judges to remind each other of their application in particular cases. That
the criteria for publication appear to be followed to a large extent even in
the absence of an enforcement officer may result from several factors.
There is discussion among panel members at post-argument conference
as to whether the disposition ought to be published. Panel members
examining a proposed disposition are not hesitant to call to the attention
of the writing judge that publication is required because, for example, no
in-circuit citations have been used. There is also monitoring by off-panel
judges who might suggest to the panel that they publish a particular
memorandum disposition. However, judges are less likely to monitor
other judges’ unpublished dispositions than their published opinions,
evident in a judge’s interview comment that there are “unpublished
dispositions that fly under the radar of the rest of the court.”21 In
addition, as they join the court,22 new judges absorb the pattern
established with respect to the types of dispositions that are to be
published. This socialization process is repeated within the community of
clerks, as departing clerks convey to their successors information about
the types of information they will prepare and as the new clerks
themselves read prior dispositions in their judge’s chambers.
Judges may also raise the non-publication issue to be considered at
court meetings, particularly at sessions, like the Ninth Circuit’s
Symposium, where the judges meet to discuss more general matters of
law and policy. One judge’s concerns about “the fidelity with which we
19
Quotes without attribution are to materials to which the author was provided
access on the condition that the names of authors would not be revealed.
20
Id.
21
Quotes from interviews are without attribution when the interviews were
conducted on the basis of the interviewee’s anonymity.
22
See Stephen L. Wasby, “Into the Soup?” The Acclimation of Ninth Circuit
Appellate Judges, 73 JUDICATURE 10 (1989).
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honor our nonpublication policy” led him to suggest having a symposium
panel, because, as he observed in a memorandum to all the court’s
judges, “Quality control involves our custom of publishing only those
dispositions that ought to be published.”23 One aspect of quality control
is a simple failure “to be more alert . . . when we agree with the result . . .
but we fail to scrutinize the language of the unpublished decision
because it is unpublished, and we don’t want to take the time to polish
the product.” Whatever prompts judges’ concerns about “quality control”
and publication practices, discussion in such settings may serve to raise
judges’ consciousness about the relevant issues and to resocialize them to
the rules. The repeated raising of the “quality control” issue makes clear,
however, that socialization, or resocialization, is never complete, and
judges’ individual inclinations or values at times cause slippage in
compliance with the rules.
II. SPECIFIC GUIDELINES
A. A New Rule of Law: Cases of First Impression
We now turn to examine each of the criteria. Among them, Rule
36-2 (a) — that publication should occur where a ruling “establishes,
alters, modifies, or clarifies a rule of law”24 — is of particular
importance. One of the principal purposes for publishing dispositions is
to add to the development of the law, and publication is clearly in order
in such cases because of their contribution to that end. This rule specifies
that cases of first impression in the circuit must be published to be
available as circuit precedent. This means that while judges may use
rulings from other circuits to support their positions, if those rulings are
sufficiently persuasive that the judges believe they should be followed
and there is no Ninth Circuit ruling on point, the disposition should be
published to create circuit precedent.
When there is no law of the circuit on point, the court is deciding
the question for the first time; by adopting the position of another circuit,
even if only by citing a case, new circuit law is created de facto. This is
true no matter how simple, trivial, and noncontroversial the point. In
such situations, the rule means that publication should follow as a matter
of course. As one judge observed, “Our conclusion that this decision
meets the criteria for publication was prompted by the fact that it

23
24

See supra note 19.
9TH CIR. R. 36-2(a).

50

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 2:041

establishes a rule of law that we had not previously announced in a
published opinion. See 9th Cir. R. 36-2(a).”25
By adopting the position of another circuit, even if only by citing a
case, a court of appeals is creating new circuit law de facto, and this does
not depend on existence of a dispute over the point for which the out-ofcircuit case is cited. Thus when a Ninth Circuit panel stated,
“Withdrawal of a plea of guilty requires that there exist a ‘cognizable
defense’ not presented at the time of the arraignment,”26 and cited only a
D.C. Circuit case for that proposition,27 the disposition should have been
published to make that point into circuit precedent. Even more obvious
was the case in which a panel, affirming a ruling of the Board of
Immigration Appeals, said that a Seventh Circuit case was “close” and
added, “We approve that decision . . .” 28; this was an adoption of an outof-circuit rule that should have been published to make the rule available
as circuit precedent.
Likewise, when a panel chooses between positions staked out by
other circuits to adopt a rule for its own circuit, publication is necessary,
as can be seen in the observation by one member of a three-judge panel
to his panel colleagues: “Because this disposition involves a choice
between a Sixth Circuit case and a Seventh Circuit case which cannot be
distinguished, I believe the disposition qualifies for publication as an
opinion under our practices.”29 This likewise applies when the law of
another circuit is rejected; here, publication is considered even more
necessary because an intercircuit conflict is being created. When the
Seventh Circuit affirmed a ruling on the basis that a motion to alter a
sentence was time-barred, the judges discussed how the circuit’s rule was
different from that in other circuits, saying they “decline the invitation”
to reconsider the rule despite the intercircuit split.30
The guideline itself does not seem to be controversial, and its
application should be fairly straightforward. A panel, dealing with a
Hawaii statute brought into play in a negligence suit against the United
States, found that “we probably had to publish in view of the absence of
25

United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2000).
See supra note 19.
27
United States v. Mignot, No. 76-3652, 554 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1977) (unpublished
table decision).
28
Park v. INS, No. 76-1356, 556 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1977) (unpublished table
decision).
29
Referencing English v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 18 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 1994) (Judge
Alfred T. Goodwin to panel). Where a case is not cited directly, but is instead noted
because it is the basis for a judge’s comment (e.g., an inter-panel memo, interview, email), the signal “Referencing” will be used hereinafter.
30
Clay v. United States, 30 F. App’x 607, 609 (7th Cir. 2002). See also Stephen L.
Wasby, Intercircuit Conflicts in the Courts of Appeals, 63 MONT. L. REV. 119 (2002).
26
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any circuit level authority” on that statute.31 There may, however, be
some disagreement as to when the guideline requires publication, but this
creates pressure that can override objections to publishing, and it
receives special attention from the judges as they communicate with each
other. The guideline’s effect can be seen in conference memos, as when a
judge was reported to have “felt that publication was appropriate,
because we do not yet have authority applying Davis [32] in the context
of a juvenile case,” and, in another case, the presiding judge, while
saying the author could prepare either an opinion or unpublished
disposition, said, “[P]erhaps it should be an opinion because it is our
circuit’s first case on this.”33 It is also reflected in the statement of a
judge circulating a proposed opinion, “Because we will be making new
law that the 1991 amendment to the §4A1.2 commentary is not a
clarifying amendment, I think we need to publish.”34 In another case, a
judge called to his colleagues’ attention “that there is currently no Ninth
Circuit law on the issue whether a court may depart based on uncounted
juvenile sentences,”35 while another writing judge said of his proposed
disposition on the applicability of Sentencing Guidelines, “We may want
to consider publishing, because there is no dispositive precedent in this
circuit, and because the issue (or closely analogous ones) likely will
recur.”36
When a writing judge raises the possible need to publish, other
members of the panel may chime in to say that publication is required
because the disposition now makes new circuit precedent. Thus, in one
case, where the author said, “As there is no Ninth Circuit precedent on
partial filing fees, this may be a decision that should be issued as an
opinion,” another panel member wrote to “suggest that it be made an
opinion since we have no precedent of our court on the subject.”37 In
another case, after a judge submitting a proposed disposition said, “We
may want to consider publishing, because there is no dispositive
precedent in this circuit,” a colleague responded, “We need law on the

31

Referencing Howard v. United States, 181 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999).
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
33
Referencing United States v. Doe, 60 F.3d 544 (9th Cir. 1995); King v. United
States, 152 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 1998).
34
Referencing United States v. Bishop, 1 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 1993).
35
Referencing United States v. Beck, 992 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
This judge originally said that not publishing was justified because of reliance on the
Guidelines, but a colleague wrote to “suggest that we publish it as a per curiam” because
the government would request publication if it were not initially published.
36
Referencing United States v. Schram, 9 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 1993).
37
See supra note 19.
32
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subject in our circuit.”38 The argument for publication on this basis can
also come later, even when the panel considers a petition for rehearing or
during consideration of a party’s request for redesignation of an
unpublished memorandum disposition as a published opinion.
Where the court does not publish in situations where no Ninth
Circuit case is cited, a litigant’s request for redesignation as a published
opinion will likely be based at least in part on the claim that the case is
one of first impression. Examples are claims that “the case is one of first
impression on the appellate court level concerning ERISA’s preemption
of this particular statute,”39 or “A number of the issues raised by this
appeal have either not been addressed in this circuit or have not received
the attention necessary to permit their citation as authority.”40 And the
judges show their sensitivity to the rule in responding to redesignation
requests, as when a judge, observing “we are contributing new Ninth
Circuit law in this disposition,” wrote to his panel colleagues that “we
may be obliged to grant the request for publication of this disposition
pursuant to our policy of publication of dispositions which cite and rely
on law from sources other than our own prior decisions.”41 However,
another judge objected, pointing to the court’s having changed the rules
so that publication was no longer mandated when the court relied on outof-circuit law. “Mere mention of a case from another circuit, particularly
when supporting our own prior rule, would not justify publication in any
event,” the judge said, “Nor would an incidental reference to another
circuit’s case, if we were not relying on it as the basis for a proposition
that we were adopting.”42 The disposition was not published.
If the writing judge appears not to have followed the rule, and the
proposed not-for-publication disposition does not contain any withincircuit citations, another panel member is likely to suggest either that
missing in-circuit precedent be found or that the ruling be published, and
will use language like, “I don’t find any Ninth Circuit precedents cited. If
there aren’t any, we will have to publish.” Thus, in a deportation case, in
sending a concurrence to the author, a judge said, “I think it should be
published even though it wasn’t argued. The reason for publication
includes: . . . citation of a 5th Circuit case, and . . . a 1st Circuit case.”
38
The former also said publication was warranted “because the issue (or closely
analogous ones) likely will recur.” See supra note 19.
39
Referencing Trs. of Elec. Workers Health & Welfare Trust v. Marjo Corp., 988
F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1993) (request from appellee made on Jan. 13, 1993).
40
Referencing United States v. Jackson, 947 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1992) (statement
made on May 27, 1992, by Charles Turner to the Clerk of the Court).
41
Lincoln Technical Inst. of Ariz., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 76 F.3d 387 (9th Cir. 1996)
(unpublished table decision).
42
Id.
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Such a suggestion might lead the author to revise the disposition to delete
the citation.
There are many unpublished memorandum dispositions where
publication seemed unnecessary because of the absence of an issue of
first impression, as when a judge, although willing to agree to
publication of a ruling, felt “that it contains no new law requiring
publication” and it was not published.43 However, there are instances
where publication was in order because the case was one of apparent first
impression in the circuit. An example was a case on a taxpayer’s claim
that the statute providing for penalties for frivolous returns (TEFRA)
violated the Origination Clause because the Senate had completely
amended the House-originated bill.44 In saying, “This contention has
been rejected by every published decision to consider the question,” the
court cited only to the Sixth Circuit and the Districts of Arizona and
Southern California, not the Ninth Circuit, so that even if the judges
didn’t want to give the tax protestor the limelight, the court’s own rules
required publication.
Situations of this sort may arise because of the need to dispose of
the increasing number of cases, with less attention being given to quality
control. Panels, a judge has suggested, “frequently fail to publish when
they should spend a little more time and produce a publishable opinion
on a subject that really is one of first impression of the circuit.”45 The
result is that “our unpublished stuff abounds with decisions citing no 9th
circuit law and relying on 5th or 8th or some other circuit’s research.”46
This is said to be a danger because the work from the other circuit “may
indeed be flawed, or obsolete” or it might “not commend itself to a panel
taking the time to really studying the matter.”47 Reliance on out-of-circuit
rulings may, however, mean that, once the panel decides to use an
unpublished memorandum to dispose of a case, the clerks assisting the
“writing” judge would look only as far as the first citation to support the
court’s ruling on a point, without considering whether it was from
outside the circuit or was “home-grown.”
The rule’s corollary is that if the court has recently published a
disposition on a particular point of law, a case shortly thereafter on the
43
Referencing Baskin Distribution, Inc. v. Pittway Corp., No. 96-35882, 141 F.3d
1173 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to panel).
44
Sherman v. Regan, No. 84-2049, 760 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1985) (unpublished table
decision).
45
E-mail from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, to Stephen L. Wasby (Apr. 27, 1999) [hereinafter Goodwin 1999 E-mail] (on file
with author).
46
Id.
47
Id.
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same point can be an unpublished memorandum disposition which cites
to that precedent,48 in part because the present case is only an application
of the law.49 For example, in December 1972, early in its use of
unpublished dispositions, the Ninth Circuit, rejecting a claim that use of
hearsay in an indictment was error, said the claim had been rejected both
in 1969 and again just five months earlier.50 Where the court has decided
a case directly on point and cites that case, thus pretty much ending the
matter, a published opinion seems unnecessary, as it would merely
reiterate the legal point.
At times, when a panel has several cases on the same point, the
judges will identify one of the cases as a “lead case” which is to receive a
published opinion, while the other cases receive memorandum
dispositions filed after the lead case and citing to it. When there are many
cases in one area of law,51 the likelihood is great that many will produce
the same issues, so that publication of some does not require publication
of other related cases. An example is immigration cases in which the INS
refuses to grant asylum and withholding of deportation.52 Unpublished
dispositions were used to deal with border search cases after AlmeidaSanchez v. United States,53 such as several 1977 rulings54 in which the
Ninth Circuit, on the government’s petition, granted rehearing and
reversed district judges’ rulings suppressing evidence because the fixed
checkpoint searches at issue took place after the date in which the en
banc Ninth Circuit had said its ruling on such searches should apply.55
48
See e.g., Brevard Eng’g Coll., No. 71-2697 (9th Cir. May, 30 1973) (citing Durst
v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 452 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1971)); Castillo v. Comm’r, 71-1922 (9th Cir.
Aug. 7, 1973) (citing Sanders v. Comm’r, 439 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1971)).
49
See infra note 198 and accompanying text for further discussion on application.
50
United States v. Sulaica, No. 72-2144 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 1974).
51
The staff attorneys identify cases with the same or similar issues, which are
grouped for assignment to one panel rather than distributed to many panels; the goal is to
reduce inconsistency in treatment.
52
An instance is a series of cases on the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of
asylum to Sikhs. See Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501 (9th Cir. 1995). The memorandum
dispositions included Sindhu v. INS, 66 F.3d 336 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table
decision), and Singh v. Ilchert, 64 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision).
Also see United States v. Lorentsen, 106 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1997), followed by Nordquest
v. United States, No. 96-80323, 107 F.3d 16 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision),
in which the two-line Order began: “For the reasons stated in Lorentsen v. United States .
. . .”
53
413 U.S. 266 (1973).
54
See United States v. Mintz, No. 74-2505, 562 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1977) (unpublished
table decision); United States v. Olmstead, No. 94-2759, 562 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1977)
(unpublished table decision); United States v. Jarvis, No. 74-2502, 538 F.2d 341 (9th Cir.
1976) (unpublished table decision), superceded by 562 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1977)
(unpublished table decision).
55
United States v. Escalante, 554 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
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Yet where there are previous rulings in the circuit, publication may aid if
it is not clear how the cases fit together. A Ninth Circuit case discussing
earlier cases arguably should have been published, particularly as it also
included a dissent.56 Where a panel engages in an extended discussion
distinguishing among past cases,57 it seems strange to go to that trouble
and then not publish, as another panel would have to go through the same
“drill.”
This guideline may also lead to publication of only one element in a
case while others are disposed of by memorandum disposition. Thus, in
denying a habeas petition challenging a state first-degree murder
conviction,58 the writing judge said, “We may want to publish at least
part of this, because we have not previously held that Carter v.
Kentucky[59] is not retroactive on collateral review under Teague v.
Lane.[60]” The other panel members agreed, with one saying that because
of publication, “I think a slightly more expansive explanation of our
conclusion that Carter did not announce a new rule is in order.”61 Having
disposed of that issue in a published opinion, the panel used a
memorandum disposition to rule on challenges to evidentiary rulings.62
Starting from its earliest use of unpublished dispositions, there are
many Ninth Circuit examples where citation to one or more Ninth Circuit
cases indicated that there was circuit precedent on the points raised, so
that publication was not necessary. In one of the court’s many Selective
Service cases, the panel quoted from earlier rulings on the point that a
draft board did not have to treat every letter from an individual as an
appeal and on implications of an applicant’s failure to provide additional
information,63 and in affirming another Selective Service case, the court
cited to two 1971 rulings concerning time periods for local board
action.64
A later instance where the result was clear on the basis of earlier
Ninth Circuit cases and non-publication would seem to follow was a case
56

See Singh v. INS, 35 F. App’x 469 (9th Cir. 2002).
See, for example, United States v. Williams, 29 F. App’x 198 (6th Cir. 2001),
involving Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). For studies of Apprendi in the
Sixth Circuit, see Emery G. Lee III, Policy Windows on the Courts of Appeals, 24 JUST.
SYS. J. 301 (2003), and Emery G. Lee III, Court of Appeals Decision-Making in the Wake
of Apprendi v. New Jersey, paper presented to Midwest Political Science Association,
April 2004 (on file with author).
58
Referencing Shults v. Whitley, 982 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1992).
59
450 U.S. 288 (1981).
60
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
61
Referencing Shults, 982 F.2d 361.
62
See Shults v. Whitley, 981 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision).
63
See United States v. Poplawski, No. 72-1959 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 1972).
64
See United States v. Brown, No. 72-2114 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 1972).
57
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challenging land use restrictions on several grounds.65 Affirming the
district court’s antitrust dismissal, the appeals court reversed as to the
lower court’s dismissals based on Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Pullman and Younger v. Harris66 and ordered the district court to stay
proceedings until state condemnation litigation was completed.
Explaining why Younger abstention was not appropriate, the judges then
noted, “Virtually every court abstaining in a land use case has ordered
Pullman abstention, not Younger abstention, and has required the district
court to retain jurisdiction,” and cited not only two Supreme Court cases
but five Ninth Circuit cases and four from other circuits.67
Where the court has made a point numerous times, publishing a
disposition reiterating it briefly and citing circuit precedents hardly
seems necessary. Thus when someone convicted for being a felon with a
firearm claimed the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), was unconstitutional
under the Supreme Court’s recent federalism cases,68 the court of appeals
took only one paragraph of discussion to say “We have repeatedly
rejected this contention” and to cite four Ninth Circuit cases in all of
which the Supreme Court had denied certiorari.69
Some examples suggest that compliance with this guideline is not
complete. As one judge has suggested, “Although an unpublished
disposition citing nothing but out-of-circuit cases is a ‘No-No,’” the
standard is “violated from time to time.”70 An early example of not
publishing a disposition in which only out-of-circuit cases were cited for
the major point in a case was one in which the Ninth Circuit said there
was no constitutional right to bail pending appeal; state judges’
discretion was upheld and cases from the Fifth and Sixth Circuits were
cited.71 If there was no Ninth Circuit case to cite, publication seemed
called for although this was a preliminary point in the case.
Another possible “rule-violation” is an early unpublished
disposition containing an extended discussion of seizure of films where
liquor is sold.72 The court said the case was no different from an earlier
Ninth Circuit case, but no Ninth Circuit citation appears; moreover, the
65
See Campbell v. City of Phoenix, No. 83-2714, 755 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1985)
(unpublished table decision).
66
R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971).
67
See Campbell, 755 F.2d 932.
68
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 524 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
69
See United States v. Rowland, 37 F. App’x 304 (9th Cir. 2002).
70
Goodwin 1999 E-mail, supra note 45.
71
See Byers v. Wood, No. 73-1552 (9th Cir. Nov. 7, 1973).
72
See Kuzinich v. Kirby, No. 26602 (9th Cir. July 26, 1973).
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memorandum disposition contained thorough substantive discussion and
the judgment was a reversal of the lower court, giving added weight to
publication, but the panel contained only two judges, who disagreed over
the rationale for their result, one concurring only in the result. However,
publication here would have revealed that the issue and its resolution
were still open matters, and the disagreement between the two judges
might call into play the statement that “if courts are using unpublished
opinions to announce new rules of decision, while self-consciously
rejecting others that might plausibly be followed, they are violating their
own standards for deciding cases without published opinions.”73
Another situation that would seem to call for publication is the
circuit’s first application of a new ruling from the Supreme Court; even if
the application seems obvious, publication should follow if the court of
appeals has not already incorporated the Supreme Court’s decision into
its own precedent. In a suit against a deputy sheriff and a county for
failure to provide prompt medical assistance, an appellate ruling on the
district judge’s summary judgment for defendants on state law claims
based on a jury answer that was limited to federal law would not have
required publication.74 However, in reversing and remanding because
retrial was necessary, the court decided a number of matters against
plaintiff/cross-appellant on the basis of the intervening ruling in Daniels
v. Williams,75 which barred recovery under § 1983 for negligence. The
statement that “negligence is not actionable under section 1983. Daniels,
106 S.Ct. at 665,” despite its obviousness, was new law in the circuit, as
was a statement that, “In the absence of a showing deliberate
indifference, a claim of negligence not actionable as a violation of due
process. Daniels, 106 S.Ct. at 665.”76 Both statements should have led to
publication.
The question of publication may have been closer in another
instance in which an unpublished disposition was used to begin the
process of applying a new Supreme Court ruling.77 Here the court of
appeals found that the district court had erred in holding that Miranda
did not apply to statements, made during a defendant’s post-conviction
talk with a psychiatrist, that were used only at sentencing, because in
Estelle v. Smith,78 the Supreme Court had “indicated circumstances in
73

Hellman statement, supra note 4.
See Condon v. County of Ventura, No. 84-5753, 792 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1986)
(unpublished table decision).
75
474 U.S. 327 (1986).
76
See Condon, 792 F.2d 144.
77
Malone v. Avenenti, No. 85-2192, 787 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table
decision).
78
451 U.S. 454 (1981).
74
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which failure to give a Miranda warning may require exclusion of a
defendant’s statements at a sentencing proceeding that does not affect the
determination of guilt or innocence.” Because the court of appeals found
that the Supreme Court’s decision came only twelve days before the
recommendations by the magistrate in the present case, the court thought
this should not prevent the defendant from presenting his claim on the
matter even in a successive habeas petition, so an unpublished
memorandum may have been thought to be a sufficient means of asking
the district judge to make the initial application of the Supreme Court’s
new decision, as the court of appeals could always publish further
explication when the case returned. And perhaps a published opinion was
not necessary to establish that Estelle v. Smith could be applied in a
habeas proceeding, as the Ninth Circuit had already so held.
If, however, in a case not yet taken to the Supreme Court, the court
of appeals issues only a simple remand to the district court to reconsider
its ruling in light of the justices’ recently-decided X v. Y, there would be
no need to publish that order, as the matter is likely to return to the court
of appeals after the district court’s action on remand, providing at that
time a sufficient opportunity to issue a published opinion. Indeed,
unpublished dispositions are often used to remand cases for further
consideration in light of a recent Supreme Court decision in a different,
but clearly related, case.79 Thus a panel vacated and remanded a district
court judgment dismissing an action because that decision had been
made “prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409 (1976)” on prosecutorial immunity, as the court of appeals
wanted the district court “to consider whether any of the allegations in
the complaint might support a finding that the district attorney acted
outside his authority or in a rule other than in his quasi-judicial
capacity”80 – the situation in which the justices had said a suit could
proceed.
B. Clarifying the Law
Even when a ruling is not totally one of first impression, its content
might contribute to the law’s development, thus suggesting the need for
publication, and Ninth Circuit Rule 36-2(a) suggests publication when a
ruling “clarifies a point of law.” Thus a writing judge told his colleagues
79

See, e.g., Port of St. Helens v. State of Oregon, No. 75-3525, 551 F.2d 313 (9th
Cir. 1977) (unpublished table decision) (remanding to the district court “for further
proceedings in light of the decision of the United States Supreme Court” in Oregon ex
rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977)).
80
United Farm Workers of Am. v. Leddy, No. 75-1691, 568 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1977)
(unpublished table decision).
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it might be better to publish a ruling because the legal issue — denial of
an insurance claim for failure to submit an authorization to view medical
records — was “rather murky.”81 Thus, a case may be published to make
matters clear to district judges. As one judge observed in a Sentencing
Guidelines case,82 “We owe it to the trial judges to give them some
guidance in this difficult area,” and in a case on possessing counterfeit
access devices and equipment, a member of the panel said he thought “it
would be helpful to the district courts and to the bar, if we publish.”83
When lawyers complain about the need for clear law, the judges
may respond with a published opinion intended to reduce some of the
confusion. Thus in one appeal centering on a sentencing guideline issue
— “what method . . . [a] district court [may] use to approximate the
quantity of drugs involved in an offense” — the writing judge, who
wrote that the issue “has not been clearly addressed by any published
opinion in this circuit,” called attention to the defense counsel’s having
“expressed frustration with the current state of law,” which the attorney
said involved cases “‘confined to their own particular facts, none of
which are cited in the opinion.’”84 As a result, the writing judge stated,
“A published order would provide direction to both parties and district
courts,” and a published ruling did result.
An instance in which publication would have been in order to
clarify the law involved a journalist’s civil contempt for refusal to
answer deposition questions about events she had seen, a topic on which
there were few cases so a ruling could have fleshed out when the
privilege applies.85 Although the court, discussing Branzburg v. Hayes86
and the balance to be struck, concluded that the need for disclosure
outweighed minimal First Amendment interests and said that journalists
could be protected without sustaining the privilege in this case, it did not
publish the ruling.87 Likewise, when the court said that a mental illness
instruction was invited error because the defense had requested it and
thus could be reversed only in an “exceptional situation,” publication
could have elucidated what was an “exceptional situation” as the judges

81

Referencing Newcomb v. Standard Ins. Co., 187 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 1999).
See United States v. Anders, 956 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1992).
83
Referencing United States v. Watson, 118 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1997).
84
Referencing United States v. August, 86 F.3d 151 (9th Cir. 1996).
85
See In re Kioshi-Nelson v. Camarcho, No. 95-1632, 758 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1985)
(unpublished table decision).
86
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
87
See In re Kioshi-Nelson, 758 F.2d 656.
82
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said the error, although more serious than those in earlier Ninth Circuit
cases cited, was not exceptional.88
However, in other situations when the distinction between
precedential cases is at issue, judges may think publication is warranted
to help clarify matters for lower court judges and for lawyers. We can see
this when a judge told his colleagues, “As to publishing the opinion, I
felt that the distinction between [two cases] by the policy language alone
would help to guide lawyers in future cases.” In another case, the writing
judge said, “The disposition is written for publication because if left
unpublished, the distinction between this case and Norgaard will be
likely to escape notice,” adding that “other ingenious counsel will keep
trying to invest in a ‘Norgaard extension’ of the silence-at-sentencing
argument”89; here we can see use of publication to clarify in an attempt
to limit future caseload. This could also be seen when a different judge
wished to publish a portion of a disposition on the issue of whether a
prisoner could obtain interest on his prison bank account: “My
preference is to publish the portion of the disposition dealing with the
interest question, so as to obviate the need for further prisoner suits on
this issue.”90
C. Calling Attention
Calling the attention of district judges and lawyers to matters they
may have overlooked (see Ninth Circuit Rule 36-2(b)) is closely related
to clarifying the law. Thus a judge preparing a memorandum disposition
said “it may be advisable to have it printed because of our analysis on the
consecutive sentence and the application of” an earlier Ninth Circuit
case; calling it “an important rule,” he felt that all district judges should
be advised on the continued viability of that case.91 When a panel
88

Referencing People of Territory of Guam v. Alvarez, 763 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.
1985) (unpublished table decision).
89
Referencing United States v. Gerace, No. 92-10388, 997 F.2d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir.
1993) (citing United States v. Norgaard, 959 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1992)).
90
Referencing Tellis v. Godinez, 5 F.3d 1314 (9th Cir. 1993); 8 F.3d 30 (unpublished
table decision) (memorandum to panel). Part of the disposition was placed in the
unpublished memorandum disposition, because, even though one of the judges was going
to dissent, he stated, “our diverse collection of views does not merit publication because
they will provide no guidance to prison administrators or district judges.” Referencing
Tellis, 8 F.3d 30 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision).
91
See United States v. Kikuyama, 109 F.3d 536 (9th Cir. 1997), referencing United
States v. Doering, 909 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1990), which held that the need for psychiatric
help was not the type of extraordinary instance where a defendant’s mental/emotional
condition was relevant to the sentence. Doering involved an upward departure from the
Sentencing Guidelines; in the present case, the court held the condition relevant to
consecutive sentences.
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considered a case on armed bank robbery, in the aftermath of a Supreme
Court ruling defining “use” of a gun,92 the writing judge had initially
circulated a brief memorandum disposition, but another panel member
had written, “I suggest that this is the kind of post-Bailey case that should
be published to assist the trial judges (and our forgetful panels).”93
A judge’s direct experience with lawyers’ lack of knowledge of
what the judge thought an important point led him to propose a published
opinion. After oral argument in a case involving a challenge to a
restitution order, the judge had sat as part of a different panel in another
case “in which the U.S. Attorney had no idea that for restitution purposes
the conduct had to be an element of the offense.”94 Because this lawyer
“appeared to be a senior attorney but was genuinely surprised when we
explained the law to him . . . I decided that an opinion explaining
Hughey[95] and the effect of the statutory amendment might be useful.”96
A disposition may also be published to remind lawyers practicing in
the court of certain procedural or substantive matters. Where the
disposition in a quiet title action involving an easement referred to the
Declaration of Taking as determinative, one judge agreed with the
writer’s proposed very brief memorandum and did not “insist” on
publication but did say, “This appears to be sufficiently important to the
bar to call attention once again to the effect of the declaration of
taking.”97
D. Criticizing Existing Law
One guideline not often at play is Ninth Circuit Rule 36-2(c),
calling for publication if the disposition criticizes existing law. Although
judges do criticize existing law when communicating among themselves
and off-panel judges may do so when arguing for holding an en banc
rehearing, one seldom sees such criticism in the court’s formal
dispositions. Nonetheless, when such criticism does find its way into
dispositions, publication should result to reveal the uncertainty in the law
thus suggested. One such candidate for publication was a case involving
the power of a district court to give consecutive sentences for a single act

92

See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
Referencing United States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 1488 (9th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam) (Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to panel).
94
See supra note 19.
95
Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990).
96
Referencing United States v. Reed, 80 F.3d 1419 (9th Cir. 1996).
97
Referencing Hermans v. United States, 86 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished
table decision). However, the author preferred not to publish and the disposition was
filed as a memorandum.
93

62

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 2:041

violating more than one subparagraph of a single statutory provision.98
Two panel members thought those sentences were invalid on the basis of
a 1972 Ninth Circuit case, which they questioned for having “incorrectly
applied the rule of lenity in looking to legislative history.” They noted
the earlier ruling’s possible inconsistency with an intervening Supreme
Court decision and had even deferred submission of the case while they
decided whether to ask for the en banc hearing that would have been
necessary if circuit precedent were to be overturned. Saying “we are
bound by our recent reaffirmation of the law of the circuit,” they
nonetheless kept the earlier ruling as circuit precedent, although they also
included a “cf” cite indicating that “if circuit precedent is undermined by
a Supreme Court ruling, a panel may reexamine earlier cases to
determine their continuing validity.”99
The need to publish this ruling, already evident from the Supreme
Court-Ninth Circuit tension the other panel members saw, is given
weight by the fact that Judge Reinhardt, even though not pressing for
publication on the basis of his separate writing, felt impelled to write,
particularly when his concurrence revealed differences in opinion as to
the interpretation of double jeopardy in this situation.100 If the case had
been published, other judges would have paid closer attention to it, and
would have been aware of the issue when it subsequently arose. When
uncertainty in the law leads the court to change its disposition upon
petition for rehearing, this also raises the question as to whether law and
its application is sufficiently clear that it can be relegated to an
unpublished disposition.101
E. Unique Interest and Substantial Importance
Judges may simply be struck by the specifics of an individual case,
making it worthy of publication. For example, in a sentencing case
involving a downward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines,
another judge argued for publication because “it is a rare case when we
affirm a Koon discretionary departure on ‘heartland’ reasoning.”102 At
98
See United States v. Yarbrough, No. 85-3041, 797 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1986)
(unpublished table decision).
99
Referencing id. The third panel member, Judge Stephen Reinhardt, concurred in
the judgment.
100
See id.
101
See, e.g., Kime v. County of Riverside, 872 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1989) (unpublished
table decision), superceded by 889 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1989).
102
Referencing United States v. Lopez, 106 F.3d 309 (9th Cir. 1997) (Judge Alfred T.
Goodwin’s note on the face of a proposed memorandum disposition). The reference is to
Koon v. United States, 581 U.S. 81 (1996) where the Court approved a downward
departure in the case of the police officers involved in the Rodney King beating.
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times publication is suggested simply because the facts are interesting, as
a judge noted of a case that involved mail fraud related to inflating the
value of a horse so as to receive a large insurance payment, but the case
was disposed of by memorandum disposition.103 In a later case on
deportation of a person found not to be a citizen, this judge suggested
that “in view of the unusual facts, I suspect it should be published, and so
suggest.”104
Although not necessarily equivalent to “importance,” the relative
complexity of the law plays an important part in the decision to publish.
Some subjects like antitrust frequently produce complex cases, which are
often published, while other topics are more likely to result in “simple”
cases disposed of with memorandum dispositions. Direct criminal
appeals are among the latter, partly the result of the high proportion of
criminal convictions and Guideline sentences appealed by federal public
defenders. However, the hypothesis that, other things being equal, cases
containing more complex issues are more likely to be published than
those with simple straight-forward issues is called into question by a
judge’s observation that “complexity is not as important in the decision
to publish as is the novelty of the questions posed or the current clarity of
the law of the circuits.”105 Moreover, the higher proportion of cases now
resulting in unpublished dispositions means that the proportion of
“heavy” cases being so decided will have increased.
F. Published Below
The rationale for Ninth Circuit Rule 36-2(e) is that if the district court
disposition was published, the court of appeals ruling should also be. As
some judges put it, where the ruling below has been published,
publication by the court of appeals “rounds out the history” of the
case.106 Subpart (e) of Rule 36-2 formerly read: “Relies in whole or in
part upon a reported opinion in the case by a district court or an
administrative agency.” The “relies in whole or in part” has been deleted,
and “unless the panel determines that publication is necessary for
clarifying the panel’s disposition of the case” has been added.107 The
103

Referencing United States v. Mosesian, 972 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1992)
(unpublished table decision).
104
Referencing Gutierrez-Tavares v. INS, 92 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 1996).
105
E-mail from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, to Stephen L. Wasby (Oct. 16, 2000) [hereinafter Goodwin 2000 E-mail] (on file
with author).
106
Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, note on face of memo transmitting proposed
unpublished disposition, Jan. 27 1997, United States v. Lopez, 95-10366; the disposition
was published, 106 F.3d 309 (9th Cir. 1997).
107
9TH CIR. R. 36-2(e).
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converse of the rule is that nonpublication below carries no burden to
publish the appeal, although other reasons related to the appeals court’s
ruling might lead to publication. For example, in a suit for negligent
supervision of a daycare center in which summary judgment had been
given to the government, the panel affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded.108 The lead judge, noting that the law clerk’s bench memo
recommended publication because the district court had published, noted
that publication was also called for “since the district court opinion
conflicts with a state court opinion, and that conflict should be
clarified.”109
The listings of over 9,800 Ninth Circuit unpublished dispositions
from October 1985 through early January 1992, contained in volumes
776 - 909 of the Federal Reporter, Second Series, show only 152 as
having been published below – less than two percent (1.6%) of the
total.110 While very few unpublished dispositions come in cases that were
published below, the number of published opinions in which the lower
court ruling was published is also small. This suggests that publication
below is not a particularly important factor in the decisions to publish or
not.111 In 2003, the proportion of unpublished dispositions with rulings
published below is only a trace – only 5 of almost 2,200 cases in fourteen
volumes of Federal Appendix (31 - 44 Federal Appendix). In cases with
published rulings, the proportion in which the lower court disposition
was published was 7.5 percent for 1973 (471 - 494 F.2d),112 but recently,
in 2002-2003 (305 - 346 F.3d), the proportion was ten percent.113
Cases reviewed on appeal lack a consistent publication pattern in
the lower court because district judges control the decision to publish,
although West does ask for some other dispositions. As a result, the court
of appeals may see no need to publish just because the district judge
108

Referencing Martin ex rel. Martin v. United States, 984 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1993).
Id.
110
Data collected by author. In calculating such a proportion, one should recognize
that agency decisions are handled differently from district court opinions. “Published
below” tends to mean district court – publication in Federal Supplement or perhaps
Federal Rules Decisions – not agency, although there are reporters for, say, NLRB cases.
In addition, that a district court opinion is available on Westlaw cite (WL cite) does not
mean to the court of appeals that it is “published below” for these purposes.
111
Many shorter Ninth Circuit dispositions, first on Westlaw and then in Federal
Appendix, lack even a West headnote and thus any indication of lower court publication,
although it might be assumed that if the case had been published below, West would give
it a headnote. Use of Federal Appendix without checking each case on Westlaw may thus
lead to an undercount of “published below” cases.
112
For that time, when use of unpublished dispositions was just beginning,
determining whether unpublished dispositions were published below is very difficult, as
the slipsheets do not so indicate.
113
If cases with WL cites are included, the figure is almost 15 percent.
109
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submitted a case for publication. While some district judges may send
rulings that are path-breaking disquisitions on the law, to which one
might expect the court of appeals to respond with a well-developed
published opinion, other district court rulings sent for publication may be
of middling importance or even relatively inconsequential, or primarily
“of interest to the local bench and bar in a particular district.”114 In
addition, the court of appeals may agree with the lower court’s judgment
but not with its opinion and may not wish to take the time to develop its
different view of the law, and the published district court ruling makes
publicly accessible at least one statement of the rationale supporting the
judgment.
As this suggests, appellate court publication of its disposition when
the district court has published is not the same as adopting the district
court ruling as its own. Nonetheless, the appeals court may do that, as
when a law clerk recommended “adopting the order of the district court
and/or the opinion of the administrative law judge,” because “[b]oth
opinions provide a more than adequate, and accurate, review of the facts
and record in this case.”115 For the court to say more, even in an
unpublished memorandum, would only “reiterate what has been said
below.” Where the court of appeals does agree with the district court’s
opinion and relies upon it in affirming, to say, “We affirm for reasons
stated in the opinion of the district court,” would take up little space in
the official reports. And if the district court has published an opinion
which the court of appeals adopts as its own, the rule would suggest that
even if the result is such a one-line ruling, it should be published.
Where the district court did not publish, agreement with the district
court does not, however, require publication on appeal, although the
court of appeals could append the unpublished district court ruling to its
own published disposition. However, in one instance when a panel
contemplated attaching the district court’s decision to an unpublished
judgment order, the judges decided that it was too long for that purpose.
Coupled with their view that publication was necessary because of the
114

WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY, PUBLICATION GUIDE FOR JUDGES OF THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1994). See also Karen Swenson, Federal District Court
Decisions and the Decision to Publish, paper presented to Midwest Political Science
Association, Chicago, Ill., Apr. 2003 (on file with author); Karen Swenson, Federal
District Court Decisions and the Decision to Publish, 25 JUST. SYS. J. 121 (2004). See
also Susan W. Johnson & Ronald Stidham, Federal District Judges and the Decision to
Publish, paper presented to Southern Political Science Association, Savannah, Ga., Nov.
2002 (on file with author).
115
Referencing Gibson v. Chater, 87 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table
decision) (memorandum from law clerk to Judge Alfred T. Goodwin). The ultimate
memorandum disposition was more than the one-line “We adopt . . .” language but was
only two paragraphs long, affirming for substantial evidence. Id.
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absence of circuit precedent on a key point at issue, they decided that
their disposition would have to become a published opinion.116
In most instances in which an unpublished disposition is used even
though the case was published below, the court of appeals affirms the
lower court. For example, we find an unpublished disposition when the
denial of a preliminary injunction was affirmed for the district court’s
reasons, although a reinforcing reason was that the appeals court would
get another crack at the case after further proceedings below.117
However, unpublished memoranda are also used when the court of
appeals reverses a published lower court ruling, a situation presenting a
strong case for appellate court publication, so that the reviewing court
can make widely known that it has overturned the lower court’s
considered judgment with one of its own.
G. Supreme Court Remands
When the Supreme Court remands a case for further action, Ninth
Circuit Rule 36-2(f) leads the court of appeals to publish its orders on
remand. These invariably short orders were not previously published,
and a 1985 Federal Judicial Center study indicated that Ninth Circuit
judges “do not necessarily publish a decision on a remand from the
Supreme Court.”118 After some judges complained, the rule was changed,
and the Ninth Circuit now publishes most rulings on remand, even
simple one-paragraph orders solely remanding to the district court “for
further proceedings consistent with” the Supreme Court’s opinion.119
Although the new rule is seemingly quite clear, a dispute may occur
over its implementation. For example, a Ninth Circuit judge sought the
help of the chief judge on “a matter about which the members of the
court need guidance” — whether publication should occur in a specified
situation.120 As the judge recounted it, the Supreme Court had reversed
and remanded a Ninth Circuit ruling that had reversed an administrative
law judge’s final determination. Receiving the case on remand, the panel
“in a fourteen-page memorandum disposition again reversed the
administrative law judge on an issue not discussed in the two published
opinions.” When a panel member suggested that publication was
116

Referencing Howard v. United States, 181 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999).
Referencing Johnson v. Orr, No. 85-2017, 787 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1986)
(unpublished table decision).
118
Stienstra, supra note 12, at 35.
119
See, e.g., Catholic Soc. Servs. v. Reno, 996 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1993). For a
marginally longer instance, see Ortega v. Roe, 209 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000), on remand
from 528 U.S. 470 (2000).
120
Judge Warren Ferguson to Chief Judge James Browning, Sept. 1 1987. The case is
not named nor is the ultimate outcome available in the file.
117
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customary after a Supreme Court’s reversal and remand, “[t]he others
decided that the case was not worthy of publication under ordinary
publication guidelines and does not meet the criteria set forth” in the
court of appeals rules.121
Publication of a ruling on remand disposing of a case on the merits
by affirming or reversing the district court would not be surprising, even
when the Ninth Circuit’s original ruling was unpublished. For example,
the Supreme Court’s per curiam reversal, in United States v.
Nachtigal,122 of a Ninth Circuit memorandum disposition led on remand
to a published ruling on the merits,123 and when the Supreme Court
reversed another Ninth Circuit unpublished memorandum on whether a
single act could constitute sexual harassment,124 the remand affirming the
district court was also published.125 Likewise, when the Supreme Court,
in its major ruling on statutory reinstatement of securities cases, reversed
three unpublished Ninth Circuit dispositions,126 the Ninth Circuit
published the order remanding to the district court.127 Of particular
interest is the instance in which, after the Supreme Court ruled on a
Ninth Circuit unpublished ruling, the court of appeals attached its prior
disposition to its published order of remand to the district court, “after
removing the restrictions against citation.”128
Publication of remand orders would certainly follow when the prior
Ninth Circuit ruling has been published, by analogy with the guideline
that when the lower court ruling has been published, the court of appeals’
disposition should also be published. For example, when a Ninth Circuit
order was reversed by the Supreme Court in the 1975 Term,129 the order
121

Id.
507 U.S. 1 (1993).
123
37 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1994).
124
Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001), rev’g 232 F.3d 893 (9th
Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision).
125
Breeden v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 258 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2001).
126
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrew v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
127
See Reitz v. Leasing Consultants, 961 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1992). See also Lozada
v. Deeds, 964 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1992) (the unpublished remand of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430 (1991), reversing and remanding the Ninth
Circuit’s unpublished order); Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1989) (the
unpublished remand of Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983), which vacated and
remanded the Ninth Circuit’s unpublished ruling, 701 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1993)
(unpublished table decision)).
128
United States v. Old Chief, 121 F.3d 448 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997). Also unusual is the
situation in which the Ninth Circuit initially issued a memorandum disposition but, after
Supreme Court oral argument, redesignated the disposition as a published opinion. See
Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 238 F.3d 1196, 1197 (9th Cir. 2002).
129
Henry v. Warner, 493 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1974), rev’d, Middendorf v. Henry, 425
U.S. 25 (1976).
122
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on remand, further remanding to the district court, was published.130
What is interesting is the almost invariant application of the rule to
orders remanding to the district court for application of the justices’
ruling. There are times when the post-remand disposition is per curiam
rather than signed, but for a short disposition, this is of no matter; under
the court’s rules, it is publication, not authorship, that matters. In other
instances, the disposition is labeled an “Order,” also unsigned,131 and the
court even uses the “Order” format when one of the panel members
dissents.132
When the Supreme Court grants certiorari, vacates the lower court
ruling, and remands (GVR) for reconsideration in light of an intervening
case, we would expect publication of the court of appeals’ subsequent
disposition because the GVR requires consideration of the Supreme
Court’s intervening ruling. Even when a GVR leads the court of appeals
to remand to the district court, the remand order will be published. And
publication is likely even when the prior Ninth Circuit ruling was
unpublished, as in the aftermath of the major Indian fishing rights
case,133 when the Supreme Court GVR’d three Ninth Circuit cases — all
unpublished — for reconsideration in light of that case.134 This shows the
strength of the rule on publication of remands from the Supreme
Court.135 However, if the GVR were for mootness, a published ruling
would hardly be necessary, unless the court of appeals had to parse the
law of mootness or it was religiously adhering to the guidelines.136
130

Henry v. Warner, 536 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1976).
See, e.g., Navarette v. Enomoto, 581 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1978).
132
See, e.g., United States v. Culbert, 581 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1978) (Ely, J.,
dissenting).
133
Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S.
658 (1979).
134
See Harrington v. United States, Dolman v. United States, and Minnick v. United
States, 604 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1979).
135
Also see United States v. Carlisle, 967 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table
decision), in which the Ninth Circuit had originally issued a memorandum disposition,
but, after the Supreme Court GVR’d, 510 U.S. 1068 (1994), in light of Ratzlaf v. United
States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994), the subsequent Ninth Circuit order was published, 18 F.3d
752 (9th Cir. 1994). See also United States v. Tomlin, 28 F.3d 110 (9th Cir. 1994), GVR,
513 U.S. 1107, in light of Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995); on remand, 62
F.3d 320 (9th Cir. 1995). Interestingly, in publishing an order on remand from a Supreme
Court GVR, the Fifth Circuit attached its earlier unpublished per curiam as an Appendix.
See United States v. Peebles, 296 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2002), on remand from Peebles v.
United States, 535 U.S. 1014 (2002), in light of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535
U.S. 234 (2002); and United States v. Tampico, 297 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 2002), on remand
from Tampico v. United States, 535 U.S. 1014 (2002), in light of same case.
136
When the Supreme Court GVR’d a Ninth Circuit en banc disposition with
instructions to have the district court dismiss the case as moot, Olagues v. Russoniello,
797 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc), GVR, Russoniello v. Olagues, 484 U.S. 806
131
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H. Separate Opinions
Some circuits’ guidelines require publication of cases with a dissent
or concurrence, and the Ninth Circuit did so earlier. The Ninth Circuit’s
present Rule 36-2(g) makes publication of these cases discretionary with
the writer.137 This makes the dissenter the de facto decision-maker as to
publication. Indeed, the extent to which the dissenter controls publication
can be seen in a Tenth Circuit case, where, attached to the designation
“Publish,” is the terse footnote: “The majority opinion is published only
because the dissent is published.”138 There has even been a situation,
which occurred relatively early in the use of unpublished dispositions, in
which a dissenter from a memorandum ruling set out the text of that
unpublished ruling in a footnote to his published dissent.139
The presence of dissents in unpublished dispositions indicates that
some dissenters do not opt for publication. A disposition with a dissent
is, however, more likely to be published than is a unanimous disposition,
so published opinions over-represent non-unanimous dispositions.140 In
1998, when the Ninth Circuit had an 18 percent overall publication rate,
two-thirds of its cases with a dissent and almost 90 percent with a
concurrence had a published opinion.141 More recently, in cases reported
in 27 Federal Appendix, dissents or concurrences were found in 1.8
percent of cases in circuits which permitted citation of unpublished
dispositions and in 2.7 percent of circuits banning such citation.142 For
the Ninth Circuit, dissents or concurrences appeared in 4.9 percent of
these “unpublished” cases.143
Separate opinions have generally been infrequent in the Ninth
Circuit’s unpublished dispositions. For example, in 31 Federal Appendix,
which contained 269 memorandums and orders from that court, there
were no concurring opinions and only two dissents.144 In one
immigration case, the dissent was a simple notation that in the judge’s

(1987), the disposition on remand was also en banc and was published. Olagues v.
Russoniello, 832 F.2d 131 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
137
Stienstra, supra note 12, at 34-35.
138
United States v. Gonzales, 344 F.3d 1036, 1037 (10th Cir. 2003).
139
United States v. Hunt, 548 F.2d 268, 268 n.1 (9th Cir. 1973) (Sneed, J.,
dissenting).
140
The Federal Reporter lists of “tabled cases” do not reveal dissents, but the dissents
are clear from the dispositions themselves and they are on Westlaw. They are now quite
apparent in Federal Appendix.
141
McKenna, supra note 9, at 19 (Table 11).
142
Stephen L. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West’s Federal Appendix: The
Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. APP. PRACT. & PROCESS 1, 19 n.83.
143
Id.
144
Data collected by author.
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opinion, “exceptional circumstances exist here.”145 The following
volume, with over three hundred cases, saw only three dissents and two
other partial dissents, and in 33 Federal Appendix, there were only two
dissents in 122 cases. The 110 Ninth Circuit dispositions in 34 Federal
Appendix prompted only five separate writings — two concurrences and
three dissents, with one concurrence and one dissent written in two
closely related habeas corpus cases by a district judge sitting by
designation.146 Thus for these four volumes, the proportion of
unpublished dispositions accompanied by separate writings was less than
one percent. By comparison, in the early years of the Ninth Circuit’s use
of unpublished dispositions, the proportion of those dispositions carrying
a separate writing started off at just under five percent (4.9%) for 1973,
the first full year in which unpublished rulings were used, before
dropping to only 2.0 percent for 1974. For 1972-1977, the overall
proportion was 3.2 percent, a proportion well above that in the most
recent period.147
To determine whether the case is more likely to result in a
published than an unpublished disposition when a judge writes a separate
opinion, published opinions in Federal Reporter for volumes covering
cases in 2002 were compared with unpublished dispositions in Federal
Appendix from roughly the same period. Comparing cases from 300-304
F.3d with those from 29-44 Federal Appendix, we find that of 2,162
unpublished rulings, 53 (only 2.5 percent) contained 56 separate
writings, compared with 13.8 percent of the 654 published rulings (90,
with 96 separate opinions).148 Here, too, there was intercircuit
variation.149 Only one of the Tenth Circuit’s 37 published opinions
(2.7%) contained a separate writing, like the overall proportion of
unpublished dispositions with separate opinions. There were similar low
145

Ahir v. INS, 31 F. App’x 588, 589 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
See Scherbovitch v. Mayle, 34 F. App’x 353 (9th Cir. 2002) (Shea, D.J.,
dissenting); Greenberger v. Farmon, 34 F. App’x 355 (9th Cir. 2002) (Shea, D.J.,
concurring). These two cases also illustrate that, when a court of appeals does not identify
the author of a memorandum disposition, identification of authorship is facilitated when
one of the three judges (all of whose names are identified) writes separately. In both these
cases, the majority opinion carried the footnote: “Of course, we express no opinion about
what the course of events might be if [the petitioner] tries to return to district court with
some newly exhausted claims at some later time. We sit to decide concrete cases, not to
engage in vaticination.” Use of words like “vaticination” is a trademark of Judge
Ferdinand Fernandez, a member of the panel.
147
Data collected by author.
148
Id.
149
The number of cases per circuit is sufficiently small that we must be careful not to
place too much weight on these figures. Because the published opinions are often much
longer than unpublished memorandums, there are far fewer per F.3d volume than per F.
App’x volume. Some published opinions are short, but most are longer.
146
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percentages in the First Circuit (5.1%) and Seventh Circuit (6.7%).
Although the Fourth Circuit had a distinctly high percentage of separate
opinions in these cases (12 of 27, 44.4%), the proportion of separate
writings in many of the circuits was between 10 and 20 percent, with the
Ninth Circuit just above 20 percent (21 cases of 97, 21.6%). For five
later volumes (320-324 F.3d) covering part of 2003, the proportion of
dispositions with separate writings was only slightly less (19.2%). For
the Ninth Circuit, the proportion of published opinions with separate
writings in 305-346 F.3d remains above one-fifth (23.8%). Because the
rate at which judges dissent or write concurring opinions may change
over time, greater frequency of separate writings in later years may
reflect a change in norms about the filing of such opinions more than an
increase in disagreement among the judges.)
One cannot read judges’ minds as to why, after preparing a
concurrence or dissent, they accede to non-publication, but one can
evaluate whether the separate writing is such that publication would have
been preferred. Publishing seems unnecessary when a judge notes a
concurrence or dissent without opinion. Although a dissent without
opinion may indicate to the losing party that someone on the court takes
that side, little would be gained from requiring publication for that reason
beyond letting the public know that the panel was not unanimous.
However, non-publication occurs even when the dissent is not simply
perfunctory. For example, in a Selective Service case, the panel initially
filed a three-page unpublished memorandum, including discussion of the
law, that dismissed an indictment.150 This drew a two-page dissent
arguing that the Selective Service System could not undo the defendant’s
violation of the law. While the initial disposition was withdrawn in favor
of a new, short unpublished memorandum in which the court remanded
to the district court for reconsideration of the effect of the District
Director’s reopening the file, the dissent was now one without opinion.
As the revised judgment only remanded for further action, publication
did not seem necessary. However, publishing the initial disposition
seemed appropriate, particularly as the dissent dealt directly with a point
of law.151
As in that case, there are instances when dissenters forego
publication even when the dissent is far longer than the majority
memorandum152 or almost as long.153 However, that a separate opinion is

150

Referencing United States v. Malone, No. 72-1847, 496 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1974).
See id.
152
See United States v. Nelson, No. 72-2350 (9th Cir. May 4, 1973), where the
majority reversed denial of a § 2255 petition and affirmed in one sentence each of two
151
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lengthy does not necessarily mean the ruling should be published, as it
may result only from a serious effort to show that the losing party’s
argument has “legs” and was heard. If the judge did not feel strongly
enough to explain the separate position or wish to take the time to write
the (more) extended analysis which publication would require, such a
dissent might provide little help in developing the law, although the
converse is that, if the panel majority decides to use an unpublished
disposition, the dissenter may decide not to expend the time to write.154
However, an unpublished dissent may communicate to judicial
colleagues who monitor such dispositions views on which the writing
judge wishes to obtain their reaction so that they will keep those views in
mind for later cases.
A dissenter may “waive” publication after having made the same
point, perhaps frequently, in published dissents, and thus does not see the
need to repeat it in print.155 Likewise, a judge might not insist on
publication when the judge’s concurrence in the result is based on his
statements in a prior published opinion, which is cited, and where the
judge says no more.156 Or the judge may forego publication of a separate
concurrence when the only point is to note disagreement with a ruling
which, along with “other controlling precedents,” provides a
“compulsion . . . to yield.”157 However, when there was non-publication
when the dissenter disagreed with the majority over its reason and,
further, said the majority had misstated what the lower court did,158 it
might appear that the panel was burying quick, careless work, with the
dissenter going along.

other issues remanding for an evidentiary hearing, but Judge Kilkenny filed a five-page
dissent.
153
For an instance of an unpublished concurrence used to send a message about the
government’s handling of a case, see the discussion infra of United States v. Archer, 92
F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision).
154
See In re Kioshi-Nelson/Chargualaf v. Camacho, No. 95-1632, 758 F.2d 656 (9th
Cir. 1985) (unpublished table decision).
155
See, e.g., United States v. Parker, No. 73-2072 (9th Cir. Nov. 6, 1973); United
States v. Graham, No. 73-2073 (9th Cir. Nov. 6, 1973); United States v. Shorty, No. 722636 (9th Cir. Nov. 6, 1973). Judge Ely, dissenting in each case, referenced his own
dissent in United States v. Holz, 479 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973).
156
See, e.g., Manzo-Rodriguez v. INS, No. 84-7287, 755 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1985)
(unpublished table decision) (Reinhardt, J., concurring in judgment, citing to RamirezJuarez v. INS, 633 F.2d 174, 175-76 (9th Cir. 1980)).
157
Williams v. Multnomah County, No. 75-2241, 554 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1977)
(unpublished table decision) (Ely, J., concurring). See also Martinez-Galvan v. INS, No.
76-1660, 556 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1977) (unpublished table decision) (Ely, J., concurring)
(“My concurrence is compelled by controlling precedent.”).
158
See Littlejohn v. Jones, No. 72-2266 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 1973).
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Those writing separately may also choose not to demand
publication when the case is a fact-intensive one that does not produce
new circuit precedent or has an unusual procedural posture that would
limit the ruling’s later effect, as the judge may feel that publishing
differing views would not be useful. An example would be a dissent
embodying a disagreement over sufficiency of the evidence.159 A dissent
containing little law, which was not only heavily fact-based but also
spoke primarily of “justice,” is likewise also not a strong candidate for
publication because it speaks more to the parties than to the legal
community that has to deal with similar future cases. An example is a
case on the severability of an (illegal) agreement to sell securities from
an agreement to provide legal services, where the majority held the
agreements not severable, but Judge Wiggins felt his colleagues in the
majority had “unnecessarily reache[d] a result that does not comport with
simple justice” because they allowed someone to get the benefit of
services without paying for them.160 In addition, when the point of the
separate opinion is to argue for remand to reconsider a portion of a
sentence and to criticize the majority for failing to provide supporting
citation or for using dicta, publication may not seem necessary to the
writer.161
A judge writing might also decline to publish a separate opinion
when the circumstances were unusual and the opinion did not
particularly speak to the development of the law, as when a concurrence
was written to explain to the parties the judge’s responsibility for
extended delay in disposing of a petition for rehearing.162
There are dissents with fact-based conclusions which would help
develop the law, leading one to question the failure to publish. In one
such case, the majority affirmed dismissal of a habeas petition which
challenged the exclusion of testimony as a sanction for violation of a
159
See United States v. Cloughessy, No. 77-1015, 572 F.2d 190, 191-92 (9th Cir.
1977) (Wallace, J., dissenting).
160
Hecht, Diamond & Greenfield v. Rosen, No. 84-6270, 790 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1986)
(unpublished table decision) (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
161
See United States v. Alvarez-Rubalcava, No. 74-3353, 556 F.2d 589 (9th Cir.
1977) (unpublished table decision) (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting).
162
See United States v. Boni, No. 74-2174, 566 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1977)
(unpublished table decision) (Ely, J., concurring). Judges Ely and (then District Judge)
Pregerson had initially dismissed a case as non-appealable but had stated that the district
judge had been correct in invalidating a statute concerning federal courts’ jurisdiction
over Native Americans. The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Wilson, 420
U.S. 332 (1975), concerning the government’s ability to appeal in certain cases,
“indicate[d] that the majority was mistaken in its original disposition,” so the previous
appellate ruling had to be vacated, but Judge Ely hoped the district judge would take the
delay into account with respect to petitioner’s speedy trial rights. Id.
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discovery order, but Judge Poole was not convinced that the jury would
have convicted if it had heard the excluded evidence and supported his
position with Fifth and First Circuit cases holding the exclusion of such
mistaken identity evidence not harmless, as well as a Ninth Circuit case
which found such exclusion an abuse of discretion requiring reversal.163
Publication would also have been appropriate where the dissenter saw
the majority opinion as “patently inconsistent” with a recent Ninth
Circuit en banc, and the majority responded in a dozen-line footnote.164
This is the sort of case that is grist for the mill for those who say that
unpublished memorandums are used to “bury” an appellate court’s
inconsistent rulings; in any event, the exchange among the judges as to
the meaning of the recent en banc opinion would likely have aided others
attempting to apply that ruling.
The “subtle interactive process among three repeat players” that
characterizes within-panel interaction in the courts of appeals means that
“appellate judges may occasionally agree that if an opinion remains
unpublished they will forgo their inclination to dissent,”165 and former
D.C. Circuit Chief Judge Wald has said that “wily would-be dissenters
go along with a result they do not like as long as it is not elevated to a
precedent.”166 This suggests a possible strategic relationship between
dissent and publication, seen in a judge’s observation that “if there is a
published opinion on the request for counsel issue, I will have to
dissent.”167
The relationship is revealed even more clearly in debate over a case
on denial of asylum and withholding of deportation for a Nicarauguan
mother and minor child.168 A proposed memorandum disposition
overturning the denial was circulated initially, with another judge telling
the author, “I don’t see any reason to publish and strongly prefer that the
disposition remain a memodispo.” However, at conference, the author
changed his mind about publication and indicated that he would
recirculate it, with publication appropriate “because there are no cases
that deal with the INS’s burden of proof after a petitioner established past
persecution.” The colleague, who would not grant asylum to opponents
163

Frederick v. Warwzeszack, No. 85-1792, 792 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1986)
(unpublished table decision) (Poole, J., dissenting).
164
United States v. Sibley, No. 72-3178, 73-1496 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 1977) (Chambers,
J., dissenting).
165
James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Designated Diffidence: District Court Judges
on the Courts of Appeals, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 565, 582 (2001).
166
Id. at 582 n.36.
167
See supra note 19.
168
Referencing Gutierrez v. INS, No. 95-70053, 95 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1996)
(unpublished table decision).
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of a now overthrown regime without proof that they still were
persecuted, now conditioned his vote on nonpublication. He was “willing
to let the petitioner stay and perhaps to withhold dissent if the disposition
were not published, but “a vigorous dissent” would accompany
publication; nonetheless he noted that the author had the “prerogative” to
publish. The third panel member first joined the author on the merits and
suggested “that we dispose of the matter with an unpublished
disposition,” but later indicated a willingness to “go along with
publication because I would like to read [the] dissent.” When, before
drafting a dissent, the putative dissenter tried to confirm that the author
still held to publishing, the latter finally withdrew, saying the disposition
would be filed as a memorandum.169
An exchange in the Eleventh Circuit also illustrates how the
publication of a ruling can become a matter of court politics. After a
disposition with a separate opinion, an off-panel judge wrote to the
panel: “I cannot understand why [this case] was not published.
I cannot recall an occasion when an opinion from a divided court
went unpublished, except in one or two rare instances when the
judges differed on a finding of fact and the opinion contained
nothing of substance regarding the law. Here, much is said
regarding points of law that are of importance to the court.170

Responding, a judge asked whether the circuit had “some written rule or
perhaps unwritten ‘tribal law’ that mandates that our opinion be
published when a judge dissents” and said he knew “of no such rule or
policy.” Not satisfied, the off-panel judge indicated an intention to seek
en banc rehearing, and tried to force publication, saying, “If the panel’s
decision is not published, I shall attach it to my dissenting opinion as an
appendix.” A member of the panel, in addition to asking why someone
would want a thoroughly disliked opinion published, emphasized that
publishing a previously unpublished disposition as an appendix to a
dissent to a denial of rehearing en banc posed a serious institutional
issue. However, the threat was carried out. The court denied en banc
rehearing, and the off-panel judge dissented at length to the denial,
adding the (previously) unpublished ruling as an appendix to his
dissent.171
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Referencing id.
See Riley v. Camp, No. 94-9118, 84 F.3d 437 (11th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table
decision) (Kravitch, J., concurring and dissenting).
171
See Riley v. Camp, 130 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 1997) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
170
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III. OTHER ELEMENTS AND NORMS
In addition to formal guidelines for publication and the criteria
embedded in them, other norms or desiderata also come into play. Some
are easily identifiable, perhaps because, like publication of reversals,
they are part of other circuits’ formal rules. In such situations, one can
talk of courts that are “reported to have adopted such a policy in
practice,” as was the case with the Ninth Circuit and intercircuit conflict
cases.172 In addition, an observer can construct categories of cases in
which use of unpublished dispositions is sufficiently regular to infer the
presence of an implicit norm, such as instances in which jurisdiction or
aspects of justiciability such as mootness keep the court from reaching
the merits, or where the court deals with non-final/non-dispositive
matters so that the case is therefore not appealable.
A. Jurisdiction
Relatively obvious candidates for unpublished dispositions are
instances in which jurisdiction or aspects of justiciability keeps the court
from reaching the merits. A ruling spelling out why the court lacks
appellate jurisdiction might be a candidate for publication to assist
prospective parties as to the rules for bringing an appeal, and fleshing out
conclusory statements about the absence of jurisdiction might help
explain the law on the subject. However, if the court of appeals cannot
reach the merits for obvious jurisdictional reasons, an unpublished
disposition may be sufficient to dispose of the case, as when there had
been judgment below on only one of several claims and no district court
certification for a non-delayed appeal; there the judges, while mentioning
the issue of whether never-served “parties” are in a case for Rule 54(b)173
purposes and cited Second and Third Circuit cases to the effect they are
not, but they said, “We need not address this issue” because of the claims
not yet adjudicated.174 This avoided the problem of having to publish
because that issue was one of first impression in the circuit.
Another instance of use of an unpublished disposition on
jurisdictional matters came when the court of appeals considered the
dismissal of a suit over recoupment of overpaid disability benefits.175 The
judges found mootness as to two of the three claims because the
172

Stienstra, supra note 12 (emphasis added).
FED. R. CIV. PRO. 54(b).
174
Great W. Sav. v. United States, No. 83-6183, 755 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1985)
(unpublished table decision). “Tempted as we might be to rule on the merits of the bank’s
argument, we must restrain ourselves.” Id.
175
See Easley v. Heckler, 84-2825, 787 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table
decision).
173
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Secretary of Health and Human Services had paid the contested amount
and waived the right to recoup overpayment, and found a lack of
jurisdiction as to the other because of sovereign immunity, a proposition
for which two Supreme Court cases were cited.176 Also related to
jurisdiction was a ruling holding that a plaintiff trying to challenge a
welfare regulation that a terminated general assistance beneficiary, to
retain benefits pending appeal, must file a notice of appeal within ten
days of the termination notice, lacked standing for having filed within the
proper time, so the district court judgment invalidating the regulation
thus had to be vacated.177
Unpublished dispositions also were frequently used when the
judges lacked appellate jurisdiction, for example, because the judgment
below was non-final and thus not appealable, as when a district court had
found 42 U.S.C. § 1983 defendants immune but had dismissed without
prejudice, a non-final order.178 In such cases, an appeal would be
available after a new judgment and new notice of appeal.179
B. “Not the Right Vehicle”
There are instances when publication might be appropriate under
the circuit’s guidelines but other concerns stand in the way. The judges
may feel that the issues have not been satisfactorily briefed, perhaps
because appellant is pro se, or that there are some other complications.
Thus in a complex immigration case, although one panel member
preferred publication because he did not like to have complicated issues
appear in unpublished memoranda, another judge wanted the disposition
to remain unpublished because the petitioner had been uncounseled and
the issues had not been briefed.180 Some Ninth Circuit judges preferred
not to deal with issues of first impression in cases that had been disposed
of by screening panels,181 perhaps because the matters had not been
176
See id. On mootness, see also Bast v. Gov’t of Guam, No. 72-1135 (9th Cir. May
14, 1973).
177
See Bustamante v. Jamieson, No. 84-1776, 758 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1985)
(unpublished table decision).
178
See Renaud v. Phelan, No. 84-1926, 760 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1985) (unpublished
table decision).
179
See e.g., Hancock Fin. Corp. v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Co., 72-1323 (9th Cir. Nov.
12, 1973).
180
Referencing Gutierrez-Tavares v. INS, 92 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 1996).
181
Cases given the lowest (lightest) “case-weights” by staff attorneys are sent to
three-panel screening panels, which dispose of cases with aid of staff attorneys, who have
prepared proposed memorandum dispositions in lieu of bench memoranda. If the judges
are on a screening panel because a case is more complex than is appropriate for
disposition before them, they can “reject” a case, that is, send it to a regular argument
panel.
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argued, and did not think such cases to be good vehicles for publishing.
However, as one judge who told his colleagues that he had “always been
reluctant to publish screening decisions on first impression issues for the
circuit” nonetheless agreed to publish one ruling because “we have clear
guidance from other circuits” on the Sentencing Guidelines issue in the
case, and another because “the issue is fairly straightforward, and oral
arguments are precluded because the pro se plaintiff is a prisoner.”182
When the court of appeals’ ruling will apply to only a limited
number of people, it may not be thought to warrant publication, just as
the Supreme Court generally does not grant certiorari when a case
applies to only a few individuals. Thus when a case is really more about
individuals’ benefits and less about a broader legal issue, a memorandum
disposition will suffice. We see this when, after termination of pilots
when they reached the maximum age for pilots and most had been
rehired in the different position of flight engineer, two remaining
plaintiffs had likewise been rehired after filing suit and their pension was
the only remaining issue.183 With an issue of limited long-term effect that
was also not likely to recur and that involved only two people,
publication seemed unnecessary.
Issuing a ruling in an unpublished disposition because of its limited
effect also took place when the court dealt with transitional
circumstances, for example, correction of sentence where a new statute
carried less stringent penalties (and the possibility of probation) than did
the one used to sentence the defendant.184 A published disposition would
have added to circuit law on the conditions under which district judges
could grant motions to correct sentences and could also have cast light on
the interplay of the new statutes, but the judges might have believed that
an unpublished disposition was sufficient, as fewer such cases would
occur as sentencing took place under the new statutes, and the fact
situation was complex, making it unlikely to recur. Another situation that
was highly unusual — not likely to recur, highly fact-bound, and for
which an unpublished disposition was used was a dispute over a
protective order and discovery orders — arose in a suit by Varig Airlines
against Boeing, in which the panel issued mandamus to the district court
to sort out “the misunderstanding and confusion” caused by the latter’s
“own regrettable and informal method of operation” in handling matters

182

See supra note 19.
Referencing Penton v. Flying Tiger Line, No. 85-5945, 788 F.2d 1566 (9th Cir.
1986) (unpublished table decision).
184
Referencing United States v. Gaglie, No. 72-2632 (9th Cir. Jan. 12, 1973).
183
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before it.185 As the panel observed, “The unfortunate chain of events
leading to this Petition are so singularly unique that we cannot conceive
that the situation will ever again be duplicated.”186
Another aspect of the “proper vehicle” question is that some courts
of appeals apparently have an inclination to wait for other cases raising
the issue, much as the Supreme Court denies certiorari in order to allow
an issue to “percolate.” Thus at least one court, faced with a case
containing a new point of law in the circuit — something that would
require the Ninth Circuit and most other appellate courts to publish —
nonetheless is said to follow the practice of not publishing on the point at
issue until it sees what other circuits are doing.187 And percolation may
be involved in the alleged practice in which the Third Circuit used
judgment orders to deal with complex cases.188
C. Diversity Jurisdiction/State Law
One aspect of jurisdiction related to non-publication is the federal
court’s diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Cases that come to the
federal courts in this way are among those most likely not to be
published because the judges, who seek to be less intrusive in
interpreting state law, realize their rulings on state law are “good law”
only until state appellate courts decide the point at issue. An authoritative
decision on the subject by the state’s highest court then immediately
displaces federal court interpretation, so that the federal court, as one
judge put it, “has written in disappearing ink.”189 The same may be true
with respect to other types of cases based on state law, such as federal
tort actions brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Thus, as
one judge observed in recommending against publication, “We should
leave such questions in the state courts where possible” and should not
publish if the case “simply involves interpreting state insurance law”;
were the case to involve “novel questions of federal law,” however,
publication might be in order.190
185
Referencing S.A. Empresa De Viacao Area Rio Granense (Varig Airlines) v. U.S.
Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist. of Wash. (Boeing Co. and Weber Aircraft Corp., real parties in
interest), No. 77-1677, 568 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1977) (unpublished table decision).
186
Id.
187
I am indebted to Wayne Logan for this information.
188
See generally Gulati & McCauliff, On Not Making Law, supra note 17.
189
Commenting on a Ninth Circuit colleague, Judge David Thompson said, “Judge
Goodwin feels that if it’s an issue of state law, it should never be published.” Open
Forum on Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference, Aug. 17, 1997, Portland,
Oregon (notes on file with author).
190
Referencing Lunsford v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., No. 91-16536 (9th Cir. Oct.
10, 1994) (Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to panel). After a request for redesignation, the
memorandum disposition was published as an opinion, 18 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 1994).
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An example of non-publication when the decision rested
fundamentally on the judges’ reading of state law is the disposition in a
suit to divide gambling proceeds, which the district court had dismissed
as a suit to enforce an illegal agreement.191 Identifying the issue as which
state’s law is to be applied as to the enforceability of agreements, the
court of appeals parsed Nevada law and found that a betting pool was
illegal everywhere, including Nevada, but said that Nevada enforced
betting pool agreements to place wagers at licensed casinos and share the
proceeds.192 Even when state law is explored in some detail, as was done
in Kent, with copious citation to cases and analysis of what those cases
require, the disposition is likely to remain unpublished because the
federal court is not the final authority on state law. Alternatively, the
ruling may be seen as an application of law as the federal court finds it
and not appropriate for publication for that reason. If the question in the
unpublished memorandum were one of federal rather than state law, the
dispositions would likely look more like a published opinion than if only
state law is involved.193
Another instance of a memorandum disposition that was an
exposition and application of state law was a ruling, on a forfeiture
action against a plane, that drew heavily on state law.194 Reversing the
district court for a clearly erroneous finding because “uncontroverted
evidence establishes Bowman’s liability for intentional interference with
contractual relations” and basing its discussion on California law, the
court of appeals looked at each of five bases of liability, devoting a short
paragraph to one and as much as two-and-one-half pages to the most
central element on which liability was found, and also devoted a
paragraph to affirmative defenses. The result was a nine-page
memorandum disposition, the civil equivalent of a multi-issue criminal
case that has a long memodispo because at least some time is devoted to
each of a number of issues. There was also a concurrence, by (then)
Judge Kennedy, but, like the majority opinion, it was based on California
law.195
Another such unpublished disposition came in an appeal from a
$65,000 judgment for a distributor who had sued Frito-Lay for breach of
contract, where the court of appeals said that the district judge had made
191

Kent v. Mindlin, No. 93-17286, 106 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table
decision).
192
Id.
193
See, e.g., Nationwide Mortgage Servs. v. Inv. Mortgage Int’l, No. 84-1691, 758
F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1985) (unpublished table decision).
194
See United States v. Bowman, No. 83-6476, 758 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1985)
(unpublished table decision).
195
See id.

2005]

Publication (or Not) of Appellate Rulings

81

a clearly erroneous finding that Frito-Lay had waived its right to
terminate the relationship without cause on notice.196 The court devoted
more than four pages to the state law issues at the heart of the case,
whether “election of remedies” applied; while much of this discussion
was fact-based, also included was a page-long discussion of election of
remedies doctrine and of criticism made of it, along with citation to cases
showing its use instead of estoppel and res judicata.197
D. Application of Existing Law
If it is most important that the judges follow the guideline calling
for publication of cases involving matters of law of first impression in
the circuit, cases in which the court of appeals, instead of announcing a
new rule, is only applying an existing rule are legitimately issued as
unpublished dispositions; an extensive opinion is said not to be needed if
the law to be applied is straightforward, and the Ninth Circuit has long
been among those courts which “do not necessarily publish these
decisions.”198 The general notion is that unpublished dispositions are to
be used in cases that break no new ground and thus do not pronounce
new circuit precedent, and particularly to dispose of cases applying
existing law to uncomplicated fact patterns. We can see this in the
judge’s comment that “the disposition of this appeal requires no more
than an unpublished memorandum, as the result reached . . . involves a
routine application of our asylum law.”199
Of course, “application” to one person is interpretation or “ruledevelopment” to another, and some see an application of a rule to new
facts as developing precedent, thus requiring publication.200 Among the
latter type of situations are those involving use of Supreme Court
decisions. For example, in deciding an appeal by a doctor charged with
issuing methadone for non-medical reasons,201 the judges said that doubts
raised by a dissent in an earlier ruling against claims about the statute’s

196

See Balding v. Frito-Lay Inc., No. 84-1816, 758 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1985)
(unpublished table decision).
197
See id.
198
Stienstra, supra note 12, at 36.
199
Rivera-Moreno v. INS, 213 F.3d 481, 487 (9th Cir. 2000) (Hawkins, J., concurring
specially).
200
Referencing Alarcon-Duarte v. INS, No. 95-70452, 87 F.3d 1317 (9th Cir. 1996)
(unpublished table decision). On June 14, 1996, Judge Alfred T. Goodwin wrote to the
panel: “I . . . respectfully suggest that we are not really interpreting the new regulation,
we are merely applying it.”
201
See United States v. Alexander, No. 75-1728, 538 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1976)
(unpublished table decision).
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coverage of “registered” physicians202 had been dispelled by a Supreme
Court ruling203 which had noted the earlier case. Such an observation by
the court of appeals judges should have been given greater notice
through publication of the disposition. Likewise, publication might have
been advisable when recent Supreme Court decisions disposed of a case
dealing with a challenge to a transfer between prisons.204 Although the
judges observed, “Recent Supreme Court decisions in Meachum v. Fano
(1976), and Montanye v. Haymes (1976), foreclose Rodriguez’s claim
that his due process was violated by being denied counsel at his prison
transfer hearing,” apparently a straight-forward matter not demanding
publication, the panel found a potential problem with the district court’s
dismissal of the prisoner’s claim about confinement in administrative
segregation.205 In reversing and remanding for further proceedings, the
judges went on to suggest how the new rulings might apply: “For due
process to attach, Meachum and Montanye teach that an action by prison
officials must deprive a prisoner of an interest in liberty rooted either
solely in the Constitution or in applicable state law operating in
conjunction with the Constitution.”206 Publication of that application
would have aided development of circuit precedent.
Non-publication even of reversals regularly takes place when the
result appears quite clear to the court and the ruling is a straightforward
application of circuit precedent. From the early years of regular use of
unpublished dispositions, one can find instances in which precedent was
clear, so that the only question was whether the law had been properly
applied. For example, publication was not necessary when the court of
appeals, relying on a case from the prior year, reversed a continuing
criminal enterprise (CCE) conviction and a firearms count dependent on
it because the jury had not been properly instructed as to whether an
individual was supervised by the defendant when, as a matter of law, that
person was not within the defendant’s supervision.207 In this reversal, use
of a memorandum disposition was acceptable because there was
recently-issued circuit precedent and the court had also warned the
parties of its applicability. And, in another instance, a panel, citing more
202

Id. (citing United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1975) (MacKinnon
J., dissenting)).
203
Id. (citing United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975)).
204
See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236
(1976).
205
Rodriguez v. Cardwell, No. 75-3338, 549 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1977) (unpublished
table decision).
206
Id.
207
See United States v. Archer, No. 93-10753, 92 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1996)
(unpublished table decision).
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than one circuit ruling on several of the points, used an unpublished
disposition to reverse and remand when a district judge made a series of
errors as to a defendant’s mental capacity.208 That the district judge was
one with whom the circuit had had difficulty may also explain the nonpublication; the judge had not changed over time, and a published
opinion would not likely have had much effect.
Among the situations in which the application of existing law is at
issue, so that unpublished dispositions are regularly used, are those in
which the district court has wide discretion and the reviewing court finds
no abuse of discretion. An early example was an affirmance of the
district court’s dismissal of a case for plaintiff’s inactivity.209 When the
court, finding no serious problem with a jury verdict, reverses the district
court’s grant of a new trial as abuse of discretion and directs entry of
judgment on the jury verdict, publication also is not necessary.210 While
such cases could in some circumstances mark out the boundary of the
trial judge’s discretion, making them appropriate for publication, in most
instances involving district court discretion, there are no “boundary”
issues because the resolution is not a close call.
E. Frivolous Cases
Somewhat related to application of the law are frivolous cases, for
which unpublished memoranda are quite likely to be used. They are
frivolous in part because the legal answer to the question posed is so
obvious that application of the legal rule is virtually automatic. When the
court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, there is little
reason to publish it unless the judges are identifying a particular element
as being frivolous as a matter of law or are stating some new element of
the law of sanctions. The same is true when the appeals court affirms a
district court ruling dismissing a claim as frivolous.
Unpublished dispositions are used when the court is faced with
certain types of frivolous claims to which it would not wish to give
publicity, such as baseless claims against the tax system. Apart from the
fact that if an argument is frivolous, discussion of it would add nothing to
the law, publishing the ruling would provide publicity to the litigant.
Faced with a claim that wages were not constitutionally taxable, the
court, citing two Ninth Circuit cases, devoted one paragraph each to
federal officials’ immunity and the Tax Injunction Act, and said, “This
208
United States v. Ayers, 37 F. App’x 921 (9th Cir. 2002). Two members of the
panel had served on the district court with that judge.
209
Mimi Motors v. Honda Motor Co., No. 72-1468 (9th Cir. June 11, 1973).
210
See, e.g., Applied Cos. v. Lockheed Martin Librascope, 37 F. App’x 865 (9th Cir.
2002).
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claim has been repeatedly rejected,” and assessed costs and attorney fees
for bringing a frivolous case.211 Likewise, when the claim was that wages
were not income subject to the income tax, the judges found that the
required administrative claim had not been made.212 Complaining about
frivolous cases, they said, “Meritless appeals of this nature clog the court
and serve no purpose for the parties,” and assessed double costs and
$1,500 for attorney fees.213
Particularly where the party making the frivolous argument is a
“frequent filer,” the last thing the judges wish to do is give that
individual the spotlight; frivolous matters brought by such litigants are
slapped down in unpublished memoranda. An example is the person who
brought numerous challenges to denial of his bar application, in one of
which the court found no district court jurisdiction over the claim
because it was a challenge not to general rules but to the state supreme
court’s decision on an individual action.214 Moreover, the court of
appeals found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s injunction
against filing additional suits and found it acceptable to give the
defendants attorney fees for a groundless action, to which they added
attorney fees for a frivolous appeal.215
The court of appeals also affirmed an injunction against the filing
of more suits by another “frequent filer” unless the cases were signed by
an attorney. Ruling in nine consolidated cases brought against Supreme
Court justices, four district judges, eight state court judges, prosecutors,
and others, the Ninth Circuit found the district court’s total ban on all pro
se claims too broad, and thus required modification of the injunction, but
only as to the defendants against whom the plaintiff could not file.216
There could be no further harassing lawsuits, but the plaintiff could file
in “other legitimate unrelated disputes.” Nonetheless, there was no

211

Williams v. Pecorella, No. 94-3961, 758 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1985) (unpublished
table decision).
212
Passow v. Dist. Dir., IRS, No. 84-1807, 758 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1985) (unpublished
table decision).
213
Id.
214
Ronwin v. Holohan, No. 83-2676, 758 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1985) (unpublished table
decision).
215
See id.
216
See Lussy v. Bennett, No. 85-3902, 788 F.2d 1565 (9th Cir. 1986); Lussy v.
Burger, No. 85-3896, 788 F.2d 1565 (9th Cir. 1986); Lussy v. Garrity, No. 85-3897, 788
F.2d 1566 (9th Cir. 1986); Lussy v. Jameson, No. 85-3898, 788 F.2d 1566 (9th Cir.
1986); Lussy v. Greely, No. 85-3599, 788 F.2d 1566 (9th Cir. 1986); Lussy v. Dunbar,
No. 85-3900, 788 F.2d 1566 (9th Cir. 1986); Lussy v. Radonich, No. 85-3901, 788 F.2d
1566 (9th Cir. 1986); Lussy v. Murray, No. 85-3903, 788 F.2d 1566 (9th Cir. 1986);
Lussy v. Hugo, No. 85-3904, 788 F.2d 1566 (9th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table
decisions).
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question about the judges’ view of the filings: “These lawsuits are a
flagrant and repeated attempt to abuse the judicial process by suing
judges . . . who have participated in previous civil actions” involving the
plaintiff.217 When the same plaintiff sued Washington’s Attorney General
for not bringing criminal charges against state judicial officers, the court
of appeals likewise affirmed the district court’s finding that the suit was
frivolous, disposing of the appeal in an unpublished memorandum by
saying briefly that the district court was not required to state detailed
reasons for granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss.218
Another candidate for nonpublication is a case with a claim or set
of claims that may have no basis, even if the judges don’t find them
frivolous. Unless the judges create new rules to “put someone out of
court,” such cases are not likely to require publication. In one such case,
a challenge to a district court dismissal of a petition to quash IRS
summons, where the claim was that the district court should have held an
evidentiary hearing, the appeals court, quoting the statute as to limits on
who received notice, said that the individual involved was not entitled to
notice of the summons and could not bring an action to quash.219 Thus
the district court’s dismissal was affirmed.
F. Fact-Based Rulings
In many instances of applying law, the facts are dominant. This is
one reason dispositions applying the law are not published. More
generally, cases requiring review of a district court’s or agency’s
interpretation of facts in relation to some standard often result in factbased rulings. These are candidates for release as memorandum
dispositions because the rulings are of minimal broader applicability. As
a judge observed in one case, “This seemed to me to be such a factspecific case that an opinion was not warranted.” In another case, in
rejecting a colleague’s suggestion of publication, a judge said, “This is a
fact specific case that I do not believe would be of precedential value,”
and, in still another case, the author, who had reported himself as leaning
to an unpublished disposition, reported, “The panel was of the opinion
that this is such a fact-specific case that we really do not need to
publish.”220

217

Id.
See Lussy v. Eikenberry, No. 85-3707, 790 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1986) (unpublished
table decision).
219
See Thiede v. Commack, No. 85-2326, 790 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1986) (unpublished
table decision).
220
See supra note 19.
218
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One reason that heavily fact-specific cases are quite likely to
receive an unpublished disposition is that the case could be decided
“either way without changing the law of the circuit or creating an
intercircuit conflict.”221 Although alteration of a rule would require
publication, these cases may fall well within the zone of an existing rule,
so that the decision is not seen as altering it. Where the new facts to
which the rule is applied are at the margin so that the rule’s domain is
affected, publication would be more likely, but it is less so when a
litigant’s claim is not close to the boundary. If one’s view of change in
the law is that application of a rule to a new set of facts does not alter the
rule itself, publication is not necessary. If, however, one takes the view
that application of a legal rule to a new set of facts — its extension to
those facts — itself alters the rule, then publication of the resulting
disposition would be in order. Thus perhaps the Ninth Circuit should not
have used a memorandum disposition to distinguish a defendant’s case
from a recent Supreme Court ruling, as that distinction may have made
the coverage of the Supreme Court ruling clearer and perhaps prevented
similar claims.222
The fact-basis of unpublished rulings can be seen in cases involving
contract interpretation, which depend on the specific wording of the
contract. An example is a reversal, as either a clearly erroneous factual
holding or an error of law, of a district court’s finding that an (illegal)
agreement to sell securities was severable from an agreement to provide
legal services.223 Use of an unpublished disposition was appropriate on
the basis that severability was a state law issue; the issue was also
heavily fact-based, and the memorandum contained little discussion of
law except at one point, on the primary purpose of the agreement.224
Likewise, the court’s reading of a trust deed to determine whether it
transferred all real property interest in the land, rather than only the legal
title to land, was a factual matter not requiring publication of the
disposition.225 Another fact-heavy case typical of those in which
unpublished dispositions are used was one in which the judges, affirming
the denial of Conscientious Objector status to a serviceman, searched the

221

Hellman statements, supra note 4, at 12.
See United States v. Hernandez-Padilla, No. 73-2225 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 1973)
(distinguishing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)).
223
See Hecht, Diamond & Greenfield v. Rosen, No. 84-6270, 790 F.2d 85 (9th Cir.
1986) (unpublished table decision). There was also a dissent by Judge Wiggins, but it was
a fact-based opinion and spoke of justice rather than law.
224
See id.
225
See In re John W. Stoller Inc., 95 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table
decision).
222
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record with respect to the sincerity of his claim.226 Another fact-based
case, a copyright case in which the plaintiff claimed his movie idea was
stolen, involved the question of similarity; this resulted in a nine-page
disposition, in which the only law discussed was the use of summary
judgment in such situations.227
Certain types of cases usually are fact-based and thus appear
regularly as unpublished dispositions. Among them are immigration
cases. Claims of persecution in applications for asylum, for example, are
fact-based although the question may be one of applying the standard to
be satisfied before asylum is to be granted.228 Criminal cases involving
the question of an adequate basis for probable cause are another type;
whether an officer had sufficient basis for probable cause or reasonable
suspicion in connection with a search or stop is usually fact-based.229
Another circuit’s chief judge has said that his experience led him to
consider that “prime candidates for unpublished opinions are Social
Security, Black Lung, and criminal cases as well as prisoner
petitioners,”230 all of which, particularly the first two, share the
characteristic of being fact-based.
Also usually fact-based and thus usually not requiring publication
are Social Security disability benefits cases. However, there are instances
where one might question use of a memorandum disposition in such a
case, such as a case in which the majority and the dissenter disagreed
over what a Ninth Circuit case required of an administrative law judge in
evaluating evidence in certain situations.231 The majority found a remand
was in order for development of a proper record “and to afford the ALJ
an opportunity to more thoroughly evaluate the petitioner’s disability and
to make further findings” because a Ninth Circuit case required a specific
finding about the diagnosis, while Judge Wallace, dissenting, said the
same Ninth Circuit case did not give presumptive weight to a treating
doctor’s report; moreover, he would not remand under it because the

226
See Ross v. Marsh, No. 84-2458, 758 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1985) (unpublished table
decision).
227
See Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1985).
228
See David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and
Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 831 (2005) (“The factually
driven, legally repetitious nature of asylum appeals would seem to make them poor
candidates for publication on the whole . . . .”).
229
See, e.g., United States v. Manning, No. 84-5138, 758 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1985)
(unpublished table decision).
230
Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177,
183 (1999).
231
See Hill v. Heckler, No. 83-2440, 758 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1985) (unpublished table
decision).

88

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 2:041

ALJ’s ruling came before the case was decided.232 To be sure, the
dissent, which found that substantial evidence supported the ALJ, was
partly fact-based, and the case had not concluded because the majority
remanded, but the disagreement over what the disputed case required
should have suggested that publication was appropriate. Similarly, when
the Third Circuit, finding no substantial evidence to support the Social
Security Commissioner’s determination concerning an individual’s level
of education, remanded for reconsideration in a fact-based ruling, its
discussion of the presumption that between completion of the sixth grade
meant a marginal education might be thought to cast light on the law,
which should have led to publication.233
G. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Among fact-specific cases appropriate for unpublished dispositions
are those in which the basic question is the sufficiency of the evidence.
Use of unpublished dispositions in such situations can be seen regularly
when the appellant in a criminal case claims that evidence was not
sufficient to sustain a conviction.234 If an unpublished disposition is
acceptable when the court affirms on the basis that the evidence was
sufficient, an unpublished disposition may likewise be acceptable even
when the court reverses for insufficiency of the evidence, as when a
panel majority, providing a paragraph of explanation, reversed for
insufficiency of the evidence, over a dissent in which the dissenting
judge spelled out at length why the evidence was sufficient to sustain the
conviction.235 One might question this failure to publish a reversal
accompanied by a dissent, but nonpublication might be appropriate
where the disagreement was only over the sufficiency of the evidence,
not the applicable law.
Use of memorandum dispositions when sufficiency of the evidence
is at issue occurs not only in criminal cases but also in civil ones, such as
those concerning Social Security disability benefits. Where agency
rulings, to which considerable deference is shown, are being reviewed
and the only issue is whether there was substantial evidence in the record
to support the agency decision, publication is unlikely.236 However, two
232

See id.
See Green v. Barnhart, 29 F. App’x 73 (3d Cir. 2002).
234
An early example is Polk v. United States, No. 72-3020 (9th Cir. Mar. 28, 1973).
235
United States v. Chapman, No. 72-1451 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 1973). Another instance
of an unpublished disposition reversing for insufficiency of evidence was United States v.
Mora-Romero, No. 73-1790 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 1973), where the panel said the outcome
was controlled by a line of Ninth Circuit cases, which were cited.
236
See, e.g., Ernst v. Richardson, No. 72-2376 (9th Cir. July 9, 1973); Gibson v.
Chater, No. 94-36133, 87 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision).
233
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matters weigh in favor of publishing rulings enforcing or denying
enforcement of agency rulings. One is that agency decisions are
published in formal agency dockets or in specialized commercial
reporters and thus fit the court’s criterion of publication when a case is
“published below.” The other is that, because these rulings are far less
visible than the district courts’ rulings, when the courts of appeals review
of the agency rulings, publication would assist in holding the agency
accountable. Cases from the NLRB also are often fact-based, particularly
when the issue is whether there was substantial evidence to support the
Board’s result. Thus, in one case, where there was no challenge to the
Board’s legal analysis but only to the evidence supporting its
conclusions, the court used a memorandum disposition in ruling that
there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings that
General Counsel had made out a prima facie case, which had not been
rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.237
Related to non-publication of such fact-based reversals are those
cases which result in unpublished rulings because as one judge stated,
“the district court really did have unresolved fact questions which it
erroneously disposed of in a summary judgment.” In one example, the
court of appeals said a union seeking arbitration claimed an oral
modification of the bargaining agreement, which was allowed under
Ninth Circuit law, and the possible existence of the modification was a
material fact about which there was a dispute, requiring reversal of the
summary judgment.238 Other circuits do this as well. Thus the Sixth
Circuit did not publish when it vacated and remanded after finding a
factual dispute over when an employee told the employer of the need for
leave – a question relevant to basing summary judgment on the statute of
limitations, and the basis for summary judgment,239 and the Tenth Circuit
used an unpublished disposition to remand because certain fact issues
remained in a case.240
Using an unpublished disposition to reverse a grant of summary
judgment may be sensible because the ruling establishes only that there
is a dispute as to material facts, with further action necessary in the case.
Not only is the judges’ determination itself fact-bound, but it will be
soon enough for the court of appeals to publish the case upon dealing
with legal issues when the case reappears on appeal after the district
237

See NLRB v. Cine Enters., 978 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table
decision).
238
See Stove, Furnace & Allied Appliance Workers v. Anaheim Mfg. Co., No. 855799, 787 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table decision).
239
Williams v. Schuller Int’l, 29 F. App’x 306 (6th Cir. 2002).
240
Dawson v. Abraham, 29 F. App’x 561 (10th Cir. 2002).
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judge applies the law to disputed facts. Certainly when the appeals court
found a factual dispute where the district court, to grant summary
judgment, had seen none, reversal by unpublished disposition seems
reasonable as the matter will proceed toward trial. Unpublished
dispositions also seem appropriate when reversal of summary judgment
comes because the plaintiff had not been given a real opportunity to
respond to defendant’s summary judgment motion. For example, the
Ninth Circuit used an unpublished disposition when an incarcerated
prisoner who, the court noted, had regularly tried to comply with Court
rules, was not given a real opportunity to respond to defendant’s motion
because of the prisoner’s changing address, to which the district court
paid insufficient attention.241 However, if instead of only overturning a
summary judgment, where the case then remains to be tried, the court
grants a summary judgment to the other side, publication might be
thought more appropriate.
IV. OTHER ELEMENTS II: REVERSALS
There are several principal reasons supporting publication of
reversals. One is that disagreement among judges over an issue, even if
“vertical” disagreement between levels of the court system, indicates that
the law is uncertain, and uncertainty is said to require debate in public.
Another that deference to the trial court or agency requires providing a
public explanation for such action, and the legal community, in
particular, deserves an explanation of the reversal. The rationale for a
published opinion in reversals is, however, undercut, at least in part, by
the relative ease with which these dispositions can be retrieved
electronically or found in Federal Appendix.
Although it has been the case that no circuit “unequivocally
requires publication when the decision is a reversal of a lower court or
agency decision,”242 some circuits have an explicit guideline that
dispositions ought to be published if the court is reversing a district
court’s or agency’s ruling. On the basis of interviews, the 1985 Federal
Judicial Center study indicated, that the Ninth Circuit’s “judges do not
necessarily designate these decisions for publication.”243 However, this
seems to be the most obvious of the court’s desiderata for publication not
explicit in its Local Rules.
By far the largest proportion of “unpublished” dispositions have
been affirmances, so labeled — whether in Federal Reporter tables of
241
242
243

See Gainer v. Agnos, 953 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision).
Stienstra, supra note 12, at 34.
Id.
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unpublished cases or cases printed in Federal Appendix. If we add
dispositions equivalent to “Affirmed,” such as “Enforcement Granted”
(for National Labor Relations Board cases) or “petition denied” (for
cases from the INS and some other agencies), as well as mandamus
denied and most “dismissals,” many of which go to the merits,244 there
are very few dispositions in which the lower court or agency is not
upheld. What then about those cases with unpublished dispositions in
which the lower court or agency judgment is disturbed in some way?245
Official data indicate that for all dispositions on the merits from
statistical year (“SY”) 1998 through SY 2001, whether published or not,
all courts of appeals were reversed or vacated at the rate of 10.4 percent
for 1997-1998 and at rates ranging from 9.1 percent to 9.5 percent for the
next three years.246 These data show that the Ninth Circuit’s variation for
1998-2001 was greater than for other circuits, ascending from 7.3 percent
in 1997-1998 to 9.4 percent in 2000-2001; for the first two years, the
244
This is particularly so in those circuits which dismiss after review of the record and
denial of a certificate of appealability (COA), or which dismiss after accepting Anders
briefs and finding no non-frivolous issue. By comparison, dismissals for lack of
jurisdiction do not go to the merits.
In 29 Federal Appendix, of 17 “dismissed” dispositions, seven were dismissals for
lack of appellate jurisdiction, as when the appeal was not timely. See McSheffry v.
Conroy, 29 F. App’x 141 (4th Cir. 2002). See also Sadowski v. Falanga, 29 F. App’x
668 (4th Cir. 2002) (when district court orders were not final); Harmon v. Davidson, 29
F. App’x 570 (10th Cir. 2002) (when the court said a petitioner must bring a habeas
action before filing a § 1983 suit); United States v. Allen, 29 F. App’x 819 (3d Cir. 2002)
(when there was no jurisdiction to review a district judge’s discretionary downward
departure from a Guidelines sentence).
Nine other dismissals were clearly the equivalent of affirmances. Some were
denials of a certificate of appealability: that the dismissal was based on the district court’s
reasoning, on a ruling that an entrapment claim was not supported, or that a guilty plea
was voluntary, or other findings of no reversible error, which indicates rulings on the
merits. See United States v. Queen, 29 F. App’x 139 (4th Cir. 2002); Slusher v. Furlong,
29 F. App’x 490 (10th Cir. 2002); Ross v. Lytle, 29 F. App’x 499 (10th Cir. 2002). So
were rulings agreeing with counsel’s assertions that the issues noted in the lawyer’s
Anders brief would be frivolous on appeal, see, e.g., United States v. Baker, 29 F. App’x
375 (7th Cir. 2002).
245
Notice that it is the judgment in which we are interested. Unless the court of
appeals affirms “for reasons stated by the district court” or “on the basis of the opinion of
the district court,” it is in some sense disturbing the lower court ruling by adopting its
own rationale for the judgment.
246
Used here is a statistical year, beginning October 1 and ending the following
September 30, and the data are drawn from the database of the Administrative Office of
United States Courts (A.O.) and from Tables B2 and B5 of the A.O.’s annual reports by
Professor Stefanie Lindquist, whose assistance is very much appreciated. For annual
reports, see http://www.uscourts.gov/library/statisticsalreports.html. The A.O. data are
reversals, and the rates do not appear to include remands. By contrast, the data gathered
by the author, and presented infra, take into account any “disturbance” by the court of
appeals of the judgment of the district court or agency.
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Ninth Circuit’s reversal rate was below the overall figure, but it was
roughly the same for the two more recent years. If all categories of
dispositions not fully sustaining the lower court are included, the rate at
which the courts of appeals disturb lower court or agency dispositions is
much greater. For part of 2002, for example, for all courts of appeals
somewhat more than half (56.4%) of the published rulings in 300 - 304
Federal Reporter upheld the lower court or agency.247 The affirmance
rates for most circuits ranged from just below half (the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits, each at 49%) to 60 percent. The Seventh Circuit had
the highest proportion of published rulings that do not disturb the lower
court (78.7%), with the Tenth Circuit also over 70 percent and the Eighth
Circuit at two-thirds; the Ninth Circuit had the lowest proportion
(44.3%). In cases from 2003 appearing in 320 - 324 Federal Reporter,
the proportion of lower court rulings which the Ninth Circuit did not
disturb was over half (54.8%), well below the proportion of such
outcomes in unpublished dispositions.
The picture for almost 2,200 Ninth Circuit unpublished dispositions
in 2002 (29 - 44 Federal Appendix) is that the proportion of such
dispositions in which lower courts’ or agencies’ rulings were left
undisturbed remained comfortably over 80 percent for all except three
volumes and only twice fell below three-quarters.248 A close-up picture is
provided by 29 Federal Appendix, where the great majority of the
dispositions for all circuits were affirmances, true, for example, of more
than four-fifths of 96 Second Circuit cases and an even higher proportion
from the Third Circuit.249 For the Ninth Circuit, a disproportionately high
90 percent were affirmances; so were over 80 percent of the Eleventh
Circuit’s listed cases. For the Sixth Circuit, three-fourths of the 36
dispositions were affirmances or the equivalent, as were virtually all the
Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuit dispositions.250
In the next volume (30 Federal Appendix), the proportion of “nonaffirming” Ninth Circuit dispositions was much higher, exceeding onethird (37%), while only one-eighth of Sixth Circuit dispositions
overturned the ruling below, but the picture in other circuits was quite
different. All eight D.C. Circuit dispositions were affirmances; in the
Seventh Circuit all but one (an attorney discipline proceedings) were
247

Data reported here collected by the author.
The exceptions are 72.5% (34 Federal Appendix) and 68.1% (41 Federal
Appendix). Data in this section collected by the author.
249
“Tabled” Third Circuit cases, which still appeared at that point, contained only
affirmances, a small number of dismissed appeals, and a couple of procedural rulings.
250
The only Federal Circuit cases that were not affirmances were two dismissals for
failure to pay a docketing fee and one case dismissed on the withdrawal of a United
States appeal.
248
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affirmances or their equivalent, and all but one of 33 Eighth Circuit were
affirmances. Although slightly less than one-half (123) of the 266 Fourth
Circuit rulings were officially labeled “Affirmed,” an equal number were
dismissals, mostly after the court had examined the merits; with other
“Affirmed” equivalents added, less than four percent of lower court or
agency rulings were disturbed.
The proportion of Ninth Circuit non-affirmances remained over ten
percent in subsequent Federal Appendix volumes; it was roughly 15
percent in 31 and 32 Federal Appendix, before dipping slightly to 13
percent (33 Federal Appendix), then rising substantially to 28 percent in
34 Federal Appendix before declining to 19 percent (35 Federal
Appendix), a higher proportion than or any other court of appeals with
nontrivial numbers of dispositions. Affirmances and equivalents were 87
percent of dispositions in both the Sixth and Tenth Circuits but a much
higher 94.5 percent in the Fourth Circuit.251 This examination shows that
overall the proportion of affirmances in published opinions is
considerably lower than the proportion in unpublished memorandums;
reversals certainly are more likely than affirmances to be published. The
clear import of these data is that dispositions disturbing lower courts
rulings are increasingly segregated in the Federal Reporter.
The courts of appeals are more likely to affirm with respect to
certain types of cases than others, so these cases make up a high
proportion of unpublished dispositions. A very high proportion of
unpublished dispositions are criminal appeals252 or habeas corpus
petitions from state convictions, and in the dominant proportion of those,
the courts of appeals affirm the conviction or the lower court denial of
habeas corpus. Also appearing in considerable number are petitions in
immigration cases where the INS has refused to grant asylum and
ordered deportation.
In 1997-1998, when the reversal rate was 10.4 percent overall
(both published and unpublished dispositions), it was 14.4 percent for
administrative appeals and 15.2 percent for bankruptcy appeals, but only
8.5 percent for criminal cases.253 Indeed, the rate of reversals regularly
was the lowest for criminal appeals – as low as 5.4 percent in 1998-1999
and 5.7 percent in 2000-2001. On the other hand, the rate of reversals
251

For the three circuits with “tabled” lists, the figures were above 90 percent: Third
Circuit, 97%; Fifth Circuit, 95.7%; and Eleventh Circuit, 90.3%. This probably resulted
from heavy use of AWOP’s (affirmances without opinion.)
252
This receives strong visual confirmation in Federal Reporter tables. The cases
captioned “U.S. v.,” most of which are criminal cases, contain an almost unbroken line of
affirmances, whereas elsewhere in a several-page list, affirmances are interrupted by
reversals, vacaturs, and appeals dismissed.
253
Data in this paragraph are derived from A.O. data. See supra note 244.
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was regularly well above the average in administrative appeals and
bankruptcy appeals (12.2% and 11.7%, respectively, in 2000-2001, and
13.3% and 11.3% in 1998-1999). Prisoner petitions (10.7% in 20002001, 11.3% in 1998-1999) and “other U.S. civil cases” (10.8% in 20002001, 11.1% in 1999-2000, 11.8% in 1998-1998) also had above-average
reversal rates. In the Ninth Circuit, where reversals certainly were more
likely than affirmances to be published, the rate of reversals in criminal
appeals was regularly well below the overall reversal rate and
administrative appeals and other U.S. civil cases well above it; reversals
in bankruptcy appeals were also well above the average in two of the
four years. The widest swing can be found in prisoner petitions, well
below the average in two years of the four (only 3.6% in 2000-2001 and
4.9% in 1998-1999) but above the average in 1999-2000 and 2000-2001
(11.6% and 13.5%, respectively).
Differential application of criteria for publication between criminal
cases and civil appeals is suggested by some judges’ belief – stated in
comments to each other – that a disproportionate number of criminal
appeals reversing the lower court are published, while most affirmances
receive unpublished dispositions. Such action might have resulted from a
belief that, just as some judges believe that oral argument should be
granted in criminal appeals, it was important to show the world that the
court was giving appropriate attention to criminal matters and
appropriately protecting defendants’ rights. The “P.R.” element in this
concern can, however, cut the other way, as when some judges
questioned whether the impression from the published criminal cases,
said to be unrepresentative, give the court a “bad rep” for being “soft on
criminals.” Here there may have been an element of the need to indicate
that, indeed, the Ninth Circuit did affirm convictions instead of “freeing
criminals,” which would counter the impression created if reversals were
more likely to result in published opinions and affirmances in not-forpublication memorandum dispositions. Although some judges had
argued “that the ‘public will know from reading the tables in the Federal
Reporter that a great many cases are decided without published opinions
and that the overwhelming majority are affirmed,’” a colleague
responded that, even if “informed lawyers will have this information
available . . . most people believe that courts are soft on crime.”254 It was
therefore, he suggested, a “disservice” to the court not to publish “more
of the significant cases in which we affirm convictions” in order not to

254
Memorandum from Judge Robert Boochever to Chief Judge Alfred T. Goodwin
concerning possible action by the court of appeals’ Executive Committee (Sept. 28,
1988).
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“further feed . . . a misguided impression that courts are soft on
crime.”255
A. Trends?
What about changes over time in the publication of rulings
disturbing lower court and agency rulings? As the proportion of
“unpublished” cases has increased, we might find a smaller proportion of
reversals among unpublished cases as the court used such dispositions
for quick stamps of approval as it attempted to cope with caseload. At
one time there may have been an assumption that reversals per se made
law and thus should be published, while now it may be understood that a
fact-based reversal no more requires publication than do other heavily
fact-based dispositions.256 However, it might be more likely that an
increased portion of memorandum dispositions would be reversals, as
non-precedential dispositions, reversals included, are issued in more
cases overall. Judges may feel that publishing explanations for reversals
may not be important in all cases, particularly where the dispositions are
now available in Federal Appendix or on-line, and that they are
providing enough material, even if in an unpublished disposition, for use
by the lower court or agency on remand so deficiencies in the earlier
proceeding can be remedied. Here we might note that if the practice were
changed to provide for publication of all dispositions other than full
affirmances, the proportion of all cases receiving unpublished
dispositions would not substantially increase, but the impression of a
higher proportion of reversals would be created by published opinions.
The overall rate of court of appeals rulings disturbing the lower
court or agency judgment has declined steadily if somewhat irregularly
from the first half of the 1970s, when it was regularly close to one-fifth
through the end of the century. For the 1970s, the proportion was 18.6
percent; it was 16.9 percent for the 1980s; and it dropped below ten
percent in the 1990s, staying below it as the century ended, with the
overall percentage for the 1990-1999 decade less than half that for the
1970s rate.257
In Ninth Circuit unpublished “table” dispositions from October
1985 through July 1990 (776 - 909 F.2d), lower court or agency
judgments predominantly were left undisturbed, but in a significant
proportion of these cases, the court of appeals nonetheless did disturb
such judgments. There is variation over time, but the proportion of
255
256
257

Id.
See discussion, supra at text accompanying notes 220-33.
Data in this and subsequent paragraphs collected by the author.
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“undisturbed” dispositions is close to or exceeds 80 percent but seldom
rises about 90 percent.258 Only seldom are less than 70 percent of the
cases undisturbed, although at times it falls to between 75 and 80
percent. For these unpublished dispositions, there is no steady overall
trend during this period although the long-term pattern reveals some
increase in the frequency with which the court of appeals makes an
alteration in the lower court or agency ruling.
Federal Judicial Center data show that in 1998, only 14 percent of
the Ninth Circuit’s dispositions affirming were published but 53 percent
of cases reversing the lower court or agency were published; for
remands, the proportion was one-fifth.259 If we extend this examination,
we find that in only half (50.9%) the cases the courts of appeals disposed
of with published opinions in 305 - 346 F.3d were the district court or
agency judgments “undisturbed,” distinctly lower than for cases with
published opinions from 1973 – where 62.9 percent of the lower court or
agency judgments were upheld or otherwise left alone. Yet even in the
early years of the use of unpublished dispositions, cases in which they
were used were more likely to result in affirmances or related
dispositions; we see this in such cases from 1972-1977, when over threefourths (76.9%) were upheld.
B. Reasons for Not Publishing
A closer look at the reversals which received unpublished
dispositions is now in order. If a presumption favors publication of
rulings that disturb the lower court’s disposition, what can we make of
such rulings issued as unpublished dispositions? Even if there is a lower
proportion of reversals among unpublished dispositions than among
published opinions, the issue is why there are any at all. We find that
good reasons within the spirit of the court’s norms exist for not
publishing most reversals which result in memorandum dispositions.
Indeed, from the beginning, among the relatively few Ninth Circuit
unpublished dispositions in which the court reversed in the early 1970s,
there were instances where a not-for-publication disposition seemed
appropriate. These included rulings modifying, remanding on
258
For “table” listings in Federal Reporter, captions (dispositions), not docket
numbers, are counted, so consolidated cases — usually criminal cases with more than one
defendant — count as one. Usually only two cases are consolidated as one, but in a case
from the Tax Court, Boushey v. C.I.R., 932 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table
decision), there are 31 docket numbers (90-79935 et seq.). Thus, if anything there is overcounting: a bankruptcy case usually has two listings, one as “In re Jones,” the other as
“Jones v. Smith”; matching of docket numbers to eliminate the duplication was not
undertaken.
259
McKenna, supra note 9, at 19 (Table 11).
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government concession of error, and reversing where retrial is necessary,
which left matters open for later appellate examination.
Some particular types of rulings disturbing the lower court
judgment where publication might seem unnecessary are quite evident.
For example, a remand in a Rule 11 case, on a government concession at
oral argument that an attorney had not reviewed one of the relevant
documents before making a declaration, hardly required a published
opinion,260 particularly where the court of appeals’ disposition does not
further discuss the law.261 Going beyond such individual instances to
look at those in 29 and 35 Federal Appendix, we find that among Ninth
Circuit rulings in 29 Federal Appendix in which the judges vacated or
reversed the lower court ruling in whole or in part, there were instances
where the appeals court’s action was minor, as when an affirmance was
accompanied by a sua sponte remand to exclude reference to a statutory
provision,262 or when the court remanded only for deletion of a statutory
reference in the judgment.263
Only slightly more serious was a case where the court upheld the
defendant’s conviction but reversed and remanded because the district
court had not made factual findings with required specificity as to a
sentence enhancement.264 In two other cases, however, the reversal was
more significant. In one, the court held that a prisoner should be able to
address directly those making decisions about him and remanded for a
determination of the critical decision-makers and whether the prisoner
had a meaningful opportunity to present his story to them.265 In the other,
while ruling that not holding a hearing on admissibility and on
prosecutorial misconduct was harmless error, the court reversed on the
ground the district court’s jury instruction did not cover the defendant’s
theory of the case, so that a retrial was necessary.266
Ninth Circuit rulings in 30 Federal Appendix that were other than
full affirmances included a remand for the relatively minor reasons that
the judgment had to reflect conviction under a particular statutory
proceeding when the district court accepted a guilty plea under Rule

260

See Clark v. United States, No. 85-2188, 792 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1986)
(unpublished table decision).
261
See United States v. Jimenez-Gutierrez, 37 F. App’x 305 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing
on government’s concession of error).
262
See United States v. Mejia-Plasencia, 29 F. App’x 444, 446 (9th Cir. 2002).
263
See United States v. Bernal-Portillo, 29 F. App’x 466, 468 (9th Cir. 2002).
264
See United States v. Blatt, 29 F. App’x 477, 480 (9th Cir. 2002).
265
See Castro v. Terhune, 29 F. App’x 463, 465 (9th Cir. 2002); the court disagreed
with the prisoner on other claims.
266
See United States v. Williams, 29 F. App’x 486, 487-89 (9th Cir. 2002).
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11267; there was also a dismissal and remand because of mootness as to
one claim and lack of ripeness as to others.268 One reversal involved only
an order taxing costs for the period before a case had been removed, in
part because the order was contrary to a state court order.269 Several other
reversals resulted from the appeals court’s determination that factual
issues remained – as to the conclusion of a subcontractor’s obligations;
the “reverse confusion” in a trademark case; and retaliation for
complaining of discrimination.270
Among other instances in which the lower court’s ruling was
disturbed, one involved a partial reversal on the basis of error as to treble
damages under New York law, with a remand to apply that law to
punitive damages for a breach of fiduciary duties,271 and there was
another partial reversal as to “unseaworthiness” resulting from a crew
member’s character although the court found in error as to giving
“maintenance and cure.”272 Among the many criminal cases disposed of
by unpublished disposition, there was one in which the court found it
was not harmless error to accept a guilty plea without informing the
defendant he could not withdraw the plea if the judge rejected the
sentencing recommendation,273 and a vacate-and-remand disposition
when the judges found defendant entitled to a Franks hearing concerning
a search warrant.274
Unpublished memorandums are used in a number of situations
when the court of appeals overturns the lower court ruling in whole or in
part:
• when clear circuit precedent is applied
• when there has been an intervening relevant ruling or action
• when technical matters must be attended to
• when matters of procedure require remanding the case
267

See United States v. Cisneros-Vasquez, 30 F. App’x 696, 697 (9th Cir. 2002).
See Eggleston v. Pierce County, 30 F. App’x 721, 723 (9th Cir. 2002).
269
See Gardner v. Nike, 30 F. App’x 726, 728 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit’s
affirmance of the summary judgment in the case had been published. See Gardner v.
Nike, 279 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2002).
270
See United States ex rel. J & A Landscape Co. v. Reza, 30 F. App’x 708 (9th Cir.
2002); M2 Software v. Viacom, 30 F. App’x 710, 712 (9th Cir. 2002) (with a oneparagraph dissent by Judge Pregerson, who disagreed that trademark law extends to CDROM products); Olson v. Teamsters Local No. 70, 30 F. App’x 718 (9th Cir. 2002) (a
split decision in which the court affirmed on failure to show a breach of duty of fair
representation).
271
See Bank Saderat Iran v. Telegen Corp., 30 F. App’x 741, 744-45 (9th Cir. 2002)
272
Torres v. Caribbean Fishing Co., Inc., 30 F. App’x 752, 753 (9th Cir. 2002).
273
United States v. Benitez, 30 F. App’x 706, 707-08 (9th Cir. 2002).
274
United States v. Flake, 30 F. App’x 736, 739 (9th Cir. 2002) (drawing a partial
dissent by Judge Tallman, id. at 740-41, who found the evidence sufficient to support the
warrant).
268
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when the ruling is fact-based, including reversal of summary
judgment because of an issue of material fact

Some of these elements have already been treated, but others require
attention here.
C. Intervening Ruling
There may be no need to publish when the court of appeals reverses
because of some intervening ruling, particularly a Ninth Circuit decision,
handed down after the district court’s judgment. The district court’s
ruling is wrong now given the changed law, but it was not wrong then,
and because the intervening decision created circuit precedent, a
following case could be unpublished. On the other hand, if application of
the intervening ruling clearly makes new law, publication would be in
order for that reason. However, when an intervening Supreme Court
ruling requires reexamination of a lower court ruling and the
distinguished district judge had done a fine job, the court might feel no
need to use a published opinion to reverse.275 In one instance, when, the
very day the instant case had been submitted in the court of appeals, the
Supreme Court handed down a ruling the judges said controlled the
precise issues before them, an unpublished disposition was thought to
suffice.276
Unpublished dispositions are used to send cases back to the lower
courts to consider an intervening Supreme Court ruling. Where the court
of appeals ruling requires reversal of the district court’s action so new
precedent can be considered, matters remain open and publication is not
necessary.277 However, to the extent the appeals court uses a remand to
assimilate the new high court case to circuit precedent, publication might
be in order. Although preliminary examination of Supreme Court rulings
would add to the law and thus should perhaps be published, nonpublication of a reversal may be excused on the basis that once the
district court had carried out its application of that preliminary
discussion, the court of appeals would have another opportunity in a
subsequent appeal to state the legal rules more fully.
An early example of such usage is a case dealing with an IRS
summons for papers held by a person’s attorney. The district court had
refused to enforce the summons on the basis that the papers remained in
the taxpayer’s “constructive possession.” Saying that the district court’s
275

See, e.g., Baucus v. Kidd, No. 72-1082 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 1973).
See Gianone and Van Epps v. A.B.C. of Cal., No. 71-3010 (9th Cir. Dec. 29,
1972), applying California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
277
See, e.g., Herron ex rel. Herron v. United States, 37 F. App’x 867 (9th Cir. 2002).
276
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action had been correct at the time, the panel majority pointed out that
the Supreme Court had then decided Couch v. United States,278 where
papers were in an accountant’s possession, and had given “constructive
possession” a narrower meaning. While the Ninth Circuit judges said
necessary reexamination of the district court ruling “can best be done by
the District Court itself,” the judges’ comments left open the possibility
of quashing the subpoena on the basis of attorney-client privilege. The
majority acknowledged the difference between papers in the hands of an
accountant (Couch) and an attorney (the present case); Judge Ely,
concurring, thought this was enough to sustain the district court “without
further ado.” That distinction might well have been the basis for
publishing, as the ruling was not a clear point-for-point application of
Couch to the Ninth Circuit’s case.279
In a number of situations when there has been some development
after the district court ruling, the court of appeals, before issuing a ruling,
wishes the district court to consider that development. In a challenge to
zoning of adult entertainment, when the city council had passed a new
resolution, the Second Circuit remanded for the district court to consider
the resolution.280 When a district court, in ruling on forum non
conveniens, had not had available a recent circuit en banc decision to
guide its evaluation, the appeals court remanded for consideration of the
factors stated in the en banc ruling and also went on to “highlight some
other matters for the District Court’s reconsideration on remand.”281
Given the range of factors the appeals court said should be considered,
the ruling might have been published as extending the relevant law. The
fallout from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey282
also produced some unpublished remands; in a case on which the appeals
court had previously ruled, the judges found an intervening ruling that
when a quantity of drugs took a sentence outside the Guidelines range,
the jury must decide, and thus remanded for resentencing.283
D. Technical and Procedural Matters
Technical matters help explain not publishing a number of
dispositions where the matters were minor and the appeals court could be
278

409 U.S. 322 (1973).
Baucus v. Kidd, No. 72-1082 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 1973).
280
Damach v. City of Hartford, 29 F. App’x 720 (2d Cir. 2002).
281
Alnwick v. European Micro Holdings, 29 F. App’x 781, 783 (2d Cir. 2002).
Included were discovery and the availability of witnesses; language barriers;
administrative burdens on the court from parallel Dutch litigation; choice of law; the
essence of the case; and plaintiff’s fraud claims. See id.
282
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
283
See United States v. Williams, 29 F. App’x 656 (2d Cir. 2002).
279
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explicit about the necessary correction. A number of these cases involved
sentencing matters. Thus the Second Circuit remanded with directions to
enter an amended judgment accurately showing the offense of conviction
and for the district judge to reconsider how to treat unserved home
detention.284 In the Third Circuit, one remand was to redetermine
restitution,285 and another, in which the court affirmed a conviction for
fugitive in possession of a gun, said the sentence could not be enhanced
for the individual being a fugitive.286
Procedural matters, where the court said nothing on the merits but
its action allowed the suit to proceed, accounted for a number of other
unpublished remands. Thus, the Sixth Circuit let a case move forward
when it used an unpublished disposition to overturn a ruling on standing
so that owners of sexually-oriented businesses could challenge zoning
and licensing ordinance.287 In a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ineffective assistance
case, the Fourth Circuit remanded for a hearing statutorily mandated
upon a certain showing.288 The Third Circuit overturned a district court
dismissal for discovery violations for having done so without findings,
an abuse of discretion.289 A Second Circuit unpublished reversal order
overturned the requirement that a plaintiff obtain the court’s permission
to file suits about his sister’s care, because no notice or opportunity to be
heard had been provided.290 A similar case involved a district court order
barring a former wife from future bankruptcy filings without court
permission, which the Third Circuit held improper for lack of notice and
for being unnecessarily broad.291
The Sixth Circuit, vacating and remanding, said the district court
should rule on qualified immunity without further discovery.292 Where
the district court had dismissed a Title VII case and had denied counsel
to the pro se plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit said that the plaintiff had raised a
question as to when he received an EEOC decision, which would start
the period for bringing suit, and, because the district court had not
indicated why plaintiff had been denied counsel, the appeals court could
not determine whether the judge had abused his discretion.293 And in a
284
285
286
287

2002).
288

See United States v. Anderson, 29 F. App’x 630 (2d Cir. 2002).
See United States v. Solano, 29 F. App’x 831 (3d Cir. 2002).
See United States v. Pritchett, 29 F. App’x 865 (3d Cir. 2002).
See Bronco’s Entm’t v. Charter Twp. of Van Buren, 29 F. App’x 310 (6th Cir.

See United States v. Hogge, 29 F. App’x 131 (4th Cir. 2002).
See Ciaverelli v. Stryker Med., 29 F. App’x 832 (3d Cir. 2002).
290
See Prince v. Dicker, 29 F. App’x 52 (2d Cir. 2002).
291
See Beeghley v. Beeghley, 29 F. App’x 907 (3d Cir. 2002).
292
See Collins v. Vill. of New Vienna, 29 F. App’x 359 (6th Cir. 2002).
293
Tannous v. Sec’y of Army/Tannous v. Commandant, Def. Language Inst., No. 832635/83-2636, 760 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1985) (unpublished table decision). The appeals
289
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case on final orders of deportation in which the ruling did not conclude
the case, the appellate judges found substantial evidence to support
deportation of the individuals as overstays, but, saying that they had no
jurisdiction to review the INS district director’s discretionary action
because the district court was the proper place, they gave petitioner 45
days to seek relief there.294
Unpublished dispositions also seem appropriate when the ruling
brought to the court of appeals is not dispositive or is otherwise
defective; included would be court of appeals’ dismissals for lack of a
final judgment or where a case is moot. Other, less recurring, instances
include a remand for a determination as to whether the offense took place
in U.S. jurisdiction, and reversals for sentencing not done properly. In
these instances, and particularly the latter, the case would return to the
court of appeals for further action, and any law the judges wished to lay
down could be published then. Still another instance was a sentencing
case in which the panel affirmed, saying there was no abuse of discretion
by the district judge; however, as the defendant could still file a motion
for reconsideration of the sentence, the case was still open.295
E. Further Action to Follow
In considering whether decisions reversing or vacating should be
published, judges might not think publication to be necessary when the
appellate ruling would not complete the case and further activity could
be expected in the district court after remand, with the case then likely to
return to the court of appeals. If the decisions embodying such remands
contain rulings that develop precedent, then the entire disposition should
be published, but many memodispos are essentially only another
procedural step in an incomplete case that provides the court with later
opportunities to speak to the law. When the court of appeals needs more
information, particularly as to facts that might underlie a decision, an
unpublished memorandum may well be used to remand. Thus in a § 1983
suit against jailers, in which the district court had given summary
judgment to the defendants on some claims, denied it as to others, and
dismissed as to still others on believing plaintiff had asked for dismissal,
the court of appeals reversed “because the record is inadequate for us to
understand the circumstances surrounding the dismissal” and remanded

court said if on remand the action was found timely filed, the district judge would have to
reevaluate the counsel request.
294
See Mehrnoosh v. INS/Sohirad v. INS, No. 81-7627/81-7646, 755 F.2d 936 (9th
Cir. 1985) (unpublished table decision).
295
United States v. Lopez, No. 73-1099 (9th Cir. June 11, 1973).
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so the district judge could “make findings as to what occurred.”296 If the
district court found that the plaintiff had in fact asked for dismissal, said
the appeals court, the judge “should make a record adequate for this
court’s review.”297 This ruling indicates how the court of appeals can
simultaneously seek more information and, more than obliquely, criticize
the district court.
Another type of case in which further district court action would
occur was one in which a preliminary injunction had been granted or
denied, because the district court’s ruling on a permanent injunction
would also likely be appealed. One can see explicit recognition of this
possibility of later appeals court work when a panel used an unpublished
memorandum to affirm a district court’s denial of a preliminary
injunction: “The substantive questions presented can await decision in a
final judgment of the district court.”298 And such a disposition was also
used to clarify the status quo ante which a preliminary injunction was
intended preserve, when the court of appeals upheld denial of a motion to
dissolve or modify a preliminary injunction.299 However, in affirming
denial of a preliminary injunction, the judges came close to a definitive
ruling when they said that plaintiffs had not shown they would probably
prevail on the merits in their challenge to double-celling in state prison,
but they still used only an unpublished memorandum even though
change would be unlikely on appeal from the merits, particularly as the
judges said they ‘were impressed by [then District] Judge Rymer’s
careful review of the conditions at CMC and her surprise inspection of
the facility.”300
Additional instances in which further action would take place in the
lower courts are remands for an evidentiary hearing,301 to clear up
matters,302 or to determine attorney fees, for example, when the court
affirmed on the principal legal question but reversed or vacated attorney

296

See Anderson v. Carey, No. 84-4243, 787 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1986) (unpublished
table decision).
297
Id.
298
Johnson v. Orr, No. 85-2017, 787 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table
decision).
299
See F.T.C. v. Paradise Palms Vacation Club and Weiswasser, No. 84-3933, 760
F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1985) (unpublished table decision).
300
Dohner v. McCarthy, 84-6048, 760 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1985) (unpublished table
decision).
301
See, e.g., Torres v. United States, No. 72-2465 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 1973); United
States v. Nelson, No. 72-2350 (9th Cir. May 4, 1973). The latter case has a five-page
dissent by Judge Kilkenny; given the length of the dissent, one wonders whether it was
prepared as a proposed disposition.
302
See, e.g., Kuchuris v. Harper, No. 72-2184 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 1973).
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fee awards.303 Other examples are remands to deal with improper
sentencing. When a conviction is affirmed but there a problem with the
sentence, perhaps because of a misapplication of an element of the
Sentencing Guidelines, judges tend to remand and to use an unpublished
ruling to do so. Thus when a judge believed he lacked authority to depart
downward, and the court of appeals, distinguishing on the basis of an
earlier case between the lack of authority and not using discretion to
depart, said that the judge’s belief was erroneous, the panel vacated and
remanded “to give the sentencing court an opportunity to exercise its
discretion.”304 Another reason for using an unpublished ruling is that the
case before the appellate court would also not be complete.
The court of appeals also used unpublished dispositions when
further work was required on an aspect of an immigration case.305 Thus
the judges denied a petition for review of denial of withholding of
deportation but remanded concerning the denial of voluntary departure,
because the only reason the Board of Immigration Appeals had given in
support of the denial was inadequate. The BIA had not mentioned that
the alien had the means to depart, and “[This court] cannot affirm the
BIA’s decision on a basis other than actually relied upon [below].”306
Where the court of appeals remands for an evidentiary hearing of some
sort, an unpublished ruling should suffice; an example would be a
remand for an evidentiary hearing as to the defendant’s understanding at
the time he waived trial.307 However, publication might be the better
option if the judges develop the law at some length.308
In a more complicated case in which a memorandum disposition
seemed appropriate because further action was necessary, the court of
appeals reversed and remanded for a hearing in which more facts would
be obtained.309 Here the district court had summarily denied a motion to
set aside a guilty plea, without saying whether the ruling was on the
merits or was based on jurisdictional problems. Nor was it clear whether
a government motion to augment the record had been granted and thus
303
See, for example, Alyeska Ski Corp. v. United States, No. 72-1539 (9th Cir. Sept.
10, 1973), where, after affirming summary judgment for the defendant, the court reversed
a $500 allowance for attorney fees without prejudice to renewal of the request and then
remanded the case for transfer to the Court of Claims.
304
United States v. Sims, 927 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision).
305
See Boules v. INS, 45 F.3d 435 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision).
306
Id.
307
United States v. Foreman, No. 84-1221, 772 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1985) (unpublished
table decision).
308
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Reed v. Commandant of Marine Corps, No. 72-1295
(9th Cir. June 11, 1973).
309
United States v. Fey, No. 84-5099, 787 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table
decision).
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was part of the pleadings; if it had been included, the defendant had not
had an opportunity to rebut new allegations. The court of appeals said
defendant had included sufficient facts to require a hearing and then
observed:
The present record raises a disputed issue of fact regarding Fey’s
guilt of a crime and his knowledge of the requirements of the law
that must first be resolved by the trial court. An evidentiary
hearing on Fey’s motion is necessary to establish the facts which
caused him to conclude that he was guilty of a violation . . . .310

It was important, in “the interests of justice,” for the defendant to have an
opportunity to have the district court consider his constitutional claim,
and if the district judge were to find an inadequate basis for holding an
evidentiary hearing, “the district court is requested to set forth the basis
for its ruling on this issue.” Because the appeals court said that
defendant’s motion should have been treated as a request for a writ of
error coram nobis, to the extent that this ruling spoke to situations in
which coram nobis might be appropriate, publication might have added
to circuit precedent.311
Why publish a remand, particularly if the lower court’s decision
might change the complexion of the case, as when the court of appeals
ruled that the district judge had not committed an abuse of discretion but
the defendant could still move to reconsider his sentence,312 so the case
thus was still open. However, if the appeals court may wish to provide
guidance, both to the court that will receive the remand to aid it in
resolving matters likely to be raised in the continued proceedings and to
other courts now, a published ruling would be better. Another ruling not
ending a case was a reversal of a district court’s dismissal of a § 1983
case by a pro se prisoner against state prison officials for seizure of legal
documents for pending cases.313 After stating that pro se complaints were
to be dismissed as frivolous only if they lacked an arguable basis, the
court explained how plaintiff’s allegations, which did not lack an
“arguable basis in fact,” might if proved show constitutional violations,
and also found another claim to have been stated with sufficient
particularity. Although using a memorandum disposition, the court took
310

Id. As the district judge, Harry Pregerson (C.D. Cal.), later a member of the Ninth
Circuit, was experienced and well thought of, there seems no need to have “held his
hand” by laying out instructions in this fashion, but doing so may have been intended to
send a message.
311
Id.
312
United States v. Lopez, No. 73-1099 (9th Cir. June 11, 1973).
313
See Jessen v. Terry/Percharo v. MacLeod, No. 84-1658, 84-1756, 755 F.2d 936
(9th Cir. 1985) (unpublished table decision).
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a paragraph to explain a Ninth Circuit case with circumstances like those
in the present one.314
F. Return After Remand
If unpublished dispositions are appropriate where further action is
to follow, it is also true that a case returning to the court of appeals after
a remand for some further action may not require publication, as the
lower court’s ruling often involves application of the legal principles set
forth in the court of appeals’ remand. When the court of appeals has
published its ruling remanding, the post-remand appeal is often handled
by unpublished memorandum — to deal with follow-up matters.315 That
the appellate court affirms when such cases return on post-remand
appeal, as it most frequently does in an yet another unpublished
disposition, would seem to show that the instruction was adequate to
allow the lower court to “get it right.”
One reason why dispositions in post-remand appeals are not
published is that these appeals are often handled by a different panel
from the one which handled the earlier appeal, and the later panel’s
judges may have a different view of what needs to be published. More
basic, however, is that if the court has set forth in the published opinion
the legal rules the district court is to apply, on post-remand appeal the
question is quite likely to be limited to whether the district court has
properly applied those rules, and such application is likely to be factspecific, making the disposition even less a candidate for publication. In
criminal cases where the appeals court has already upheld the conviction
and the remand was only for resentencing, the post-remand appeal quite
likely will be limited to that question. Publication is not seen as
necessary in such cases, often involving factual questions of application
of the Sentencing guidelines, particularly where the sentence is upheld.
Thus unpublished rulings are used when the court deals with elements of
a case that “follow on” prior action.
If the initial remand order is unpublished, the ruling in any followup appeal will usually also be unpublished. One reason is that
affirmances are likely in post-remand appeals, and unpublished
dispositions are more likely when the court affirms. Where the initial
remand was not published, only infrequently does the post-remand
appeal produce a published disposition. Given the upward trend in
unpublished dispositions over time, one would not expect many initially
314

Id.
On occasion, the Federal Reporter table indicates that the appeal being decided is
on remand from an earlier ruling, for which the citation is provided.
315
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unpublished dispositions to result in published opinions upon appeal
from the remand. If a case stood a certain chance of being published
when it was first heard, by the time it returned to the court after remand,
the likelihood of publication would be less, all things being equal. In
memorandum dispositions of appeals from remands, roughly twice as
many came from initial remands that had been published. Thus, cases
initially published but unpublished on post-remand appeal are more
frequent than unpublished initial appeals also unpublished on postremand appeal.
G. Sending a Message
Use of an unpublished disposition may be a way to soften a
reversal. There are instances when, particularly where other criteria do
not seem to require publication, the court may intentionally use an
unpublished disposition to call some failings to the attention of a judge or
prosecutor quietly, particularly if the judge is otherwise well-respected or
the prosecutor has not previously caused problems. This may be done
when judges have erred but where the problem does not seem systemic,
as the latter would make publication more appropriate; lawyers can be
chided for misbehavior in the same way. In short, the court can
administer some discipline but, by leaving the disposition unpublished,
can soften the blow in correcting an errant district judge or out-of-line
prosecutor. The judges thus send a “message” without hanging the
official “out to dry” by including the criticism in a published opinion. In
a recent reversal for prosecutorial misconduct, one of the judges, noting
that “publication may be a career damaging event for the prosecutor,”
commented to his colleagues that the prosecutor needed to be called on
what the judge referred to as “pettifogging” — “but not necessarily in
public.”316
Although “messages” are more often negative, they can be either
negative or positive. An example of the latter is the statement, on the
appeal of a complicated patent case that resulted in a ten-page
memorandum disposition, “We conclude the trial court tried well a
difficult case, carefully analyzed the evidence and reached a result
consistent with the law as announced in this circuit.”317 The court may
sometimes convey that the district judge “got it right” even when it is
reversing the judge’s decision. Although a reversal is, of course, usually
a negative message, it might be accompanied by this positive message if
316

Referencing United States v. Leon-Gonzalez, No. 00-50698, 24 F. App’x 689 (9th
Cir. 2001).
317
MacDermid Inc. v. S. Cal. Chem. Co., No. 74-2791, 549 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1977)
(unpublished table decision).
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intervening law led to the reversal. Thus when, subsequent to a
conviction for an ammunition offense, the Ninth Circuit had said that
specific intent had to be shown, thus requiring reversal of the conviction,
the panel said, “We note on behalf of the District Court that the first
impression decision” in that Ninth Circuit case “was entered subsequent
to the trial and entry of the judgment of conviction and sentence
herein.”318 If an intervening Supreme Court ruling means that a lower
court ruling must be reexamined and the district judge, a distinguished
one, had done a fine job, the court of appeals would not feel the need to
reverse in a published opinion.319 One judge observed in an interview
that if the court of appeals was going to reverse a lower court because of
an intervening Supreme Court or court of appeals decision and the
district judge had “got it right” in deciding the case initially, it was only
humane and courteous for the court of appeals to note explicitly that the
judge had applied correctly the law in effect at the time of that
decision.320
If positive views could be conveyed even in reversals, negative
comments could be made even when the district judge was being
affirmed. At times, this occurred as to sentencing, when the appeals court
might suggest that a sentence was too harsh, even though valid. In a
particularly obvious example, a panel affirming a sentence upon a
conviction for importing aliens because “The sentence imposed is within
the statutory limit,” added a comment after the ritual “Judgment is
affirmed,” in which it said:
We note . . . while recogniz[ing] that sentencing is within the
discretion of the trial court, the sentences imposed seem harsh in
view of the nature of the offense. The defendant’s offense cannot
be condoned; it calls for punishment. We suggest that the
District Court seriously consider exercising its power under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure No. 35 to reduce the
sentence imposed.321

While appellate judges correcting an errant district judge may
soften the blow of a reversal by leaving the disposition unpublished, on
the other hand, they may want to send a message about disliked practices
which do not necessarily lead to reversals of convictions and hence will
publish the opinion in order to “get the word out” about a particular
318

United States v. Morales, No. 76-1310, 546 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1976) (unpublished
table decision).
319
See, e.g., Baucus v. Kidd, No. 72-1082 (9th Cir. Dec. 17 1973).
320
See supra note 21.
321
United States v. Ortiz-Martinez, No. 76-2189, 546 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1976)
(unpublished table decision).
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practice. In such situations, an unpublished disposition might not have
been efficacious before such dispositions were available on-line or in
Federal Appendix. However, particularly in the early years of
unpublished dispositions, when there were fewer of them, a published
opinion might not have been needed to get a point across to others
through a reversal or criticism because one could assume that other
judges would read them, and, as U.S. Attorneys were thought to collect
and reach such dispositions, perhaps they would have “heard” those
directed at prosecutors. Heavier caseload may have altered that situation,
but in any event, if the unpublished disposition did not bring change,
later opinions could be published to convey the appeals court’s view
about a particular practice.
In one instance, from another circuit, the court sent a message both
to a judge and to a lawyer, when the presiding judge delivered the
opinion from the bench, after which it was transcribed and released as an
unpublished ruling.322 Thus the lawyer would have been present to “get
the message” with others also hearing it. Chief Judge Becker was quite
blunt: “we will surely not pin any medals on plaintiff’s counsel for
celerity or diligence in getting the material to the defense. She acted here
more like the tortoise than the hare, but ultimately she did get them what
they needed.”323 In the same case, in which the court reversed and
remanded a district court’s dismissal as an abuse of discretion for having
been taken without findings and without weighing relevant factors, Judge
Becker, naming the judge, said: “Judge [J. Curtis] Joyner is a very able
member of the District Bench, a man whom we all admire and respect.
But just as it was said of the great Homer, that Homer nods, in this case
Judge Joyner nodded and acted a little precipitously.”324
The entire panel can send the message, but it can also be sent in a
judge’s separate writing, for example, a concurrence adding to the
majority’s opinion. For example, in a Third Circuit case, Judge Becker,
pointing to problems with the trial judge’s post-trial opinion on motions
and to his inconsistencies, first complemented the trial judge as “an able,
experienced, and conscientious jury,”325 but then said: “In this high
profile case, perhaps in an effort to tie down every loose end, he may
have said too much. In another sense, however, in terms of not clearing
up the issues that trouble me he may have said too little,”326 but that
might have stemmed from the defendant not raising issues at trial.
322
323
324
325
326

See Ciaverelle v. Stryker Med., 29 F. App’x 832 (3d Cir. 2002).
Id. at 834.
Id.
Gov’t of V.I. v. Bryan, 29 F. App’x 65, 69 (3d Cir. 2002) (Becker, J., concurring).
Id. at 69-70.
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H. Judges
At times the “message” need not be very strong, and it may be less
a “message” to “shape up” than a note of mild criticism. Thus, in an
employment case involving payment of pension to individuals rehired in
different positions after the termination for age, a panel observed, “Our
review is somewhat hampered by the district court’s failure to prepare
findings of fact and conclusions of law.”327 As this judge was highly
respected and regularly sat with the Ninth Circuit, the judges did not find
the need to administer public embarrassment in a published opinion.
Another instance of a slight knuckle-rapping of a judge came when
a panel reversed a summary judgment because the plaintiff had not been
provided a real opportunity to respond to the defendant’s motion.328 As
the judges observed,
The district court should not have granted summary judgment
against an incarcerated prisoner when the record showed that the
motion for summary judgment had not been sent to the prisoner.
The court could have ascertained the reason for the plaintiff’s
failure to respond by examining its own records.

One element of a “message” is criticism. We see this in a
bankruptcy case involving the transfer of mining claims.329 After a
bankruptcy court finding of a joint venture was reversed by the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP), further action in the bankruptcy
court and the court of appeals led ultimately to affirmance of the BAP’s
ruling. The bankruptcy court then issued supplemental orders,
confirming sanctions and the property transfer. In this procedurally
complex matter, the court of appeals then used another memorandum
disposition to reverse the BAP for misapplying the appeals court’s earlier
decision, which it said was the law of the case only on the joint venture
issue. While conceding “some logic to the BAP’s conclusion” that the
transfer of mining claims should be reversed and the joint venture
finding fell together, the Ninth Circuit said, “However, this Court could
not have made its finding more plain . . . .” And the judges added, “The
BAP is wholly without authority to ‘correct’ what it apparently perceived
as our misunderstanding of its prior decisions.” The court of appeals also
said that the BAP ruling on the sanctions “exceeded the directives of our
judgment” because “sanctionable violations” would stand even if the
327
Penton v. Flying Tiger Line, No. 85-5945, 788 F.2d 1566 (9th Cir. 1986)
(unpublished table decision).
328
See Gainer v. Agnos, 953 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision).
329
See In re Zodiac Inv. v. Cal. Pozzolan, 45 F.3d 438 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished
table decision); Judge Kleinfeld dissented.
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violated orders were subsequently reversed.330 Here, we see the court of
appeals “woodshedding” the BAP with less publicity than a published
opinion would have produced, although the procedural complexity of this
case, which made it quite fact-heavy, would have also tilted the court
toward non-publication, which had been used when the case had earlier
appeared on appeal.
In another case, one of four elements addressed was “Judicial
Misconduct” involving the judge’s questioning of witnesses.331 Saying it
had “reviewed each of the judge’s comments set forth in appellant’s
briefs,” the Ninth Circuit found some “ill-advised and inappropriate.”
However, in part because the judge had told the jury that his comments
were not evidence, the court found that no comments “reach the level of
bias or prejudice required by this court to support an assertion that the
trial judge’s conduct affected the jury’s ability to reach an impartial
decisions.”332 As the appeals court did not reverse, this was a case in
which the court seemed to send a message through its languages.
However, as the district judge was one against whom repeated
complaints of misconduct had been filed in the judicial discipline system
– the judge later was precluded from hearing certain types of cases – one
wonders whether anything was served by keeping the criticism
unpublished.
The court of appeals did publish its criticism of another judge with
whom the circuit had had to deal a number of times. The court ruled that
the conduct of the judge – who, the appellant claimed, “took over the
examination of witnesses in an excessive and abusive manner,
denigrating the efforts of counsel to put on the plaintiff’s case, and
excluded proferred testimony, in a rude and domineering manner”333 –
did not deny a fair trial nor make the judge’s factual findings erroneous.
However, the court, while saying that the trial “was not a travesty,” the
judges said it “would not serve as an example for the training of new
judges,” and, criticizing the judge while upholding his rulings, said,
“Intemperate bench behavior does not require reversal merely to chastise
a judge if the judgment appealed from was one supported by the law and
facts.”334
330

See id.
See Fast v. Diplarakos, No. 83-6505, 755 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1985) (unpublished
table decision).
332
Id.
333
Stuart v. United States, 23 F.3d 1483, 1485 (9th Cir. 1994).
334
Id. at 1486. In addition to the fact that publication of this criticism meant that more
judges and lawyers would read about it, further publicity came from a story in a Los
Angeles legal newspaper, which quoted from the ruling. Headlined “Judge Lydick
Criticized by Appeals Court,” the article said that the judge, “once called ‘the meanest
331
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Of course, the court of appeals may further indicate its displeasure
by reversing a district judge directly by remanding with instructions to
enter a specific judgment instead of remanding for further proceedings.
Thus in a case involving a breach of contract, where the district judge
made a clearly erroneous finding and was wrong on the state law issue
involved, the court of appeals, reversing, gave judgment directly to one
of the parties, and the court was also critical of the judge.335 Another
such case was a blunt reversal of a summary judgment granted to an
insurance company in a third party complaint for indemnity under
investment trust insurance policies.336 Reversing, holding that the notice
period should have been tolled, and remanding only so summary
judgment could be given to appellant, the court of appeals said the
district court’s analysis was “without merit” and indicated that the
judge’s action “imposes fault on the appellant for the precise act against
which he insured; appellant could not have given notice of potential
claims of which he had no notice.”337 Leading to an unpublished result
may have been the fact that this case involved interpretation of state law
and the high respect the court otherwise had for the judge, William Gray,
of the Central District of California.
In still another case, the appeals court indicated its annoyance at the
district court and, reversing for the second time, took action itself rather
than leaving it to the trial judge.338 The court had earlier reversed the
district court’s conclusion that a joint venture existed as well as a finding
as to an individual’s degree of negligence, remanding for redetermination
of the latter and of economic damages.339 When the case returned to the
court of appeals, the judges said, “On remand . . . the district court
apparently misread our instructions and adopted a completely new
finding of fact and conclusion of law,” and had again found a joint
venture, although “Our earlier memorandum . . . foreclosed this

judge in town’ by a magazine has been chastised for his lack of civility by an appeals
court,” and put the court’s publication of the criticism in context by saying, “The appeals
court’s comments about Lydick are unusual. The court usually refrains from criticizing
judges’ demeanor – even when it has been controversial.” Susan Seager, Judge Lydick
Criticized by Appeals Court, LOS ANGELES DAILY J. (n.d.) (on file with author).
335
See Balding v. Frito-Lay Inc., No. 84-1816, 758 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1985)
(unpublished table decision).
336
Pegasus Fund v. Laraneta, No. 84-5644, 767 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1985) (unpublished
table decision).
337
See id.
338
Steiner v. United States, No. 80-5177, 685 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1982) (unpublished
table decision).
339
See id.
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possibility.”340 They went on to say, “By altering its earlier findings and
conclusions on this point the district court exceeded our mandate.” Then,
pointing out that Ninth Circuit cases set out how to calculate damages in
wrongful death Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) cases, the judges said,
“The district court here did not specify how it applied the English
factors.” Observing that “[o]rdinarily, we would remand on that ground
alone,” the court took matters into its own hands: “There has already
been a remand in this case, however, and we conclude that judicial
economy and the interests of the parties will be best served if we proceed
to the merits of the damages issues.” Thus the court was conveying that it
wished the matter done right rather than have the district judge — the
strong-willed Manuel Real of the Central District of California, with
whom the court of appeals had prior experience — again make a hash of
matters. The appeals court did accept some of Judge Real’s findings but
found others were incorrect and still others “inadequate and clearly
erroneous,” and the panel specified the damages to be awarded.341
The court’s exasperation with some judges can increase to the point
where it is unwilling to limit itself to an unpublished memorandum, but
publishes a ruling to make clear its displeasure with the district judge. A
judge’s failure to “get it” upon being reversed is one such situation. In a
housing discrimination suit by African-Americans, the district judge had
denied compensatory damages for humiliation for emotional distress.
Reversing upon finding clear error for the failure to award these
damages, the court of appeals said such matters could be the basis for
damages and noted that plaintiffs had provided considerable evidence
that would support such an award.342 On remand, the district judge
ordered damages of only $250 and excused the defendants’ behavior.
Again reversing and remanding, the Ninth Circuit said,
We are disappointed that this case is again before us. We hoped
our previous opinion would lead to an appropriate award of
compensatory damages or a settlement by the parties.
Unfortunately, in light of the de minimis damage award, we must
again reverse for clear error and remand for an award consistent
with the purpose of § 1982 and the discrimination cited in
plaintiffs’ brief.343

340

Steiner v. United States, No. 83-6042, 760 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1985) (unpublished
table decision).
341
Id.
342
See Johnson v. Hale, 940 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
343
Johnson v. Hale, 13 F.3d 1351 (9th Cir. 1994). The author had written to his
colleagues, “Because the first opinion was published and because the district judge needs
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That, however, was not all, as the opinion ended with the statement,
“Although we decline to set a damage award ourselves, the two appeals
in this relatively simple case indicate that some direction is necessary,”
because “the disregard of recent relevant precedent has caused an
unseemly delay of some five years and has wasted judicial resources.”344
The minimum damages award was then spelled out, although the opinion
said the district judge “may, of course, award more after reviewing the
authorities cited above,”345 and the judges also made clear that attorneys
fees should be awarded.
I. Prosecutors
Instead of imposing sanctions on prosecutors or referring a matter
for discipline, appellate judges, even when not overturning a conviction,
may convey unhappiness with the government’s position and also
provide a “heads-up” as to proper practice. One instance involved a
prosecutor, who had engaged in “hammering down the credibility of the
defendant” and, when the defendant had no duty to produce evidence,
had raised the question why defendant had not produced a Puerto Rican
birth certificate. Calling the comment “a blunder,” the court said, “If the
case were at all close, we might have to call it an unconstitutional
shifting of the burden of proof,” but instead, given other evidence, the
judges were willing to let it go as “practically a textbook example of
harmless error.”346 In that way, they sent a message.
A message was also clearly conveyed in comments on a case
challenge to an affidavit used to support a search warrant. Saying “that in
this case no reason whatsoever appears why the ‘individual’ referred to
in the affidavit should not have been named and identified,” the judges
observed, “why law enforcement officers insist on being so obtuse in the
preparation of affidavits to support search warrants, in view of the
continuing attacks on their sufficiency, is a policy that cannot readily be
understood.”347
In another case, a judge who was himself a former U.S. Attorney
used a concurring opinion to send a stronger message. The court, said the
judge, had “alerted” both defendant and government “to be prepared to

a wake-up call, I think we should publish this.” Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to panel, Dec.
17, 1993.
344
Id.
345
Id. at 1354.
346
United States v. Hernandez-Ramon, 933 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished
table decision).
347
United States v. Cameron, No. 74-1472 (9th Cir. Sept. 3, 1974, amended Jan. 29,
1975).
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argue the applicability of [a case] to the facts of the case.” When the
government failed to do so, the court was “compelled” to reverse.348 Said
Judge Hawkins, delivering the message, “Perhaps the arguments were
not there to be made. . . . If, on the other hand, the arguments were there
to be made, it is most unfortunate for this is a very serious crime and it
merited the government’s most serious attention.”349
In still another unpublished disposition, the court accepted filing of
a superceding indictment in the face of “misconduct in the grand jury
process,” but criticized the government,350 saying, “The government’s
behavior here falls significantly below the high standards we expect, and
with very few exceptions receive, from the United States Attorney’s
Office,” and adding, “Had the government acted more diligently and
expeditiously, it may not have been necessary to go a different grand jury
for the superceding indictment.” The judges then talked about actions
that left “something to be desired” or were “equally disquieting,” and
ended by saying that the agent’s “misstatement of a damning confession”
by one defendant directly “represents behavior at odds with the
American system of justice.” The court has also shown that it can
criticize not only a prosecutor’s improper action at trial but also the
government’s initiating of the case itself: “We fail to understand why
prosecutorial discretion was exercised to bring this petty offense
[involving a credit card] into the heavily overburdened federal courts”
when state law provided a sufficient basis for prosecution.”351
While sending strong messages in unpublished dispositions might
keep it out of someone’s official file, regularly placing such messages in
memodispos may fail to send a broader message to the law enforcement
community which might assist in keeping it accountable. Similarly, one
might ask if these “messages,” or expressions of exasperation at lawyers
in private practice,352 reach their intended audience, much less have a
noticeable effect. One might ask that same question with respect to the
court of appeals’ ruling in a complicated suit to collect part of a
judgment that also entailed claims of fraud upon the court. Although the
judges had discussed among themselves publishing a later ruling should
348

United States v. Archer, 92 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision).
Id.
350
United States v. Tomlin/United States v. Spas/United States v. Manley, No. 855001/85-5002/85-5006, 792 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table decision).
351
Id.
352
See, e.g., Eureka Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Kidwell, 937 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1991)
(unpublished table decision) (ruling that a Rule 11 sanctions order had to be vacated on
the authority of a Ninth Circuit case “which was the law of the circuit at the time the
sanctions were ordered” and otherwise raising a question about the basis on which the
sanction was sought).
349
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certain negative facts be found on remand, the court used an unpublished
disposition for a message to the lawyers. After an initial affirmance by
published opinion,353 a company in the proceedings sought to have the
judgment against it set aside because of evidence it claimed revealed
fraud on the court. In overturning summary judgment for defendants, the
author wrote to his colleagues on the panel, “This draft does not accuse
the two allegedly mendacious lawyers by name. That can be saved for
publication if necessary after a court having nisi prius powers decides
that somebody lied to a judge, and that the judge believed the lies, and
then was thereby induced to enter a judgment by mistake.”354 As he
observed in the disposition, “If no such evidence [that a lawyer lied to
the court] is produced, the suggestion of professional misconduct by one
or more lawyers will be put to rest.”355
V. CONCLUSION
This article presents an examination, primarily descriptive, of
appellate court publication practices, with primary attention given to
more than thirty years’ use of unpublished dispositions by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with a focus on the court’s use of its
own criteria and other non-formal facts that affect publication.
Certain findings are of particular note. One is that the court of
appeals reverses or in some other way disturbs the decision being
reviewed far more frequently in cases with published opinions than in
those receiving unpublished memorandums; the same is true with respect
to those cases in which a judge writes a concurrence or dissent. With the
increase in the proportion of cases receiving non-precedential
dispositions, those which are published are disproportionately those in
which the court of appeals disturbs the lower court’s or agency’s
judgment and in which internal disagreement is manifest in concurring
and dissenting opinions. Thus published opinions in Federal Reporter
are an increasingly segregated set of cases with important policy
content,356 through which the court of appeals performs its law-making
function while its error-correction work is heavily relegated to
unpublished memorandum dispositions. That unpublished rulings contain
many judgments disturbing lower court and agency rulings suggests that
they all are not simple, routine, “cookie-cutter” cases.
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United Commercial Ins. Servs. v. Paymaster Corp. 962 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1992).
Referencing id. (Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to panel).
355
Paymaster Corp. v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., 91 F.3d 154 (9th Cir. 1996)
(unpublished table decision).
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Most assuredly there are unpublished dispositions the publication
of which seems either necessary or at least strongly suggested. Such
cases can provide grist for the mill of those who approach court of
appeals’ publication practices with a critical eye or opposition to the use
of any unpublished rulings and who build their argument from egregious
anecdote rather than a broader view. However, when the great bulk of
these rulings are examined, on the whole there seem quite few about
which non-publication can be questioned.
For many, perhaps most, dispositions, not publishing seems
explainable in terms of the courts’ formal criteria, which thus can be said
to have an effect. However, there are also instances when, viewed in
terms of the criteria, failure to publish is problematic. One would perhaps
not expect it to be otherwise when application of the rules rests almost
solely with the judges. Yet, despite the obvious effect of judges’
discretion, the judges are definitely constrained by the criteria and by
other norms which have developed over time but which are not
incorporated in the formal publication criteria. These elements take their
force from interaction among the judges and from parties’ occasional
requests to redesignate unpublished dispositions as opinions. The
presence of rough edges in the system is hardly surprising, given the
partial indeterminacy of the process by which it is decided to publish or
not and a decentralized process of guideline implementation, where the
judges exercise discretion in applying publication guidelines and there is
no Publication Czar to make initial determinations or to reverse judges’
publication decisions. Within this context, one is indeed struck by the
extent to which, overall, the court has followed, or complied with, the
criteria rather than departed from the norms.

